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ABSTRACT 
 
DETERMINANTS OF TAX EFFORT: A CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
 
by Mark Alan McCoon 
 
May 2012 
 
This paper analyzes the determinants of tax effort.  Tax effort is defined as the 
aggregate tax level of a country divided by its Gross Domestic Product.  A country‘s tax 
effort is an expression of the tax burden the government imposes on the economy.  One 
of the most fundamental issues confronting a society is the size of the governmental 
sector.  How large should the government be relative to the size of the economy?  The 
nations of the world have crafted many different answers to that question as evidenced by 
the fact that tax effort and the size of government sectors varies widely.  At the low tax 
extreme countries such as Guatemala can have tax efforts as low as ten percent of GDP 
while at the other extreme high tax countries such as Sweden have tax efforts in excess of 
fifty percent of GDP (World Bank 2010).  While part of the variation in tax effort and the 
size of government among countries has been explained, much remains unexplained.  The 
extent to which national cultural attributes as determined by Hofstede (2005) and the 
World Values Survey (2010) affect total tax levels is explored in this paper.  In other 
words, this paper answers the question: does culture affect total tax effort and the size of 
the governmental sector?  This research contributes to the literature by explaining more 
of the difference in tax effort among nations and by expanding our understanding of why 
some countries are high tax states and others are low tax states. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the determinants of tax effort.  Tax effort is defined as the 
aggregate tax level of a country divided by its Gross Domestic Product.  A country‘s tax 
effort is an expression of the tax burden the government imposes on the economy.  The 
extent to which national cultural attributes as determined by Hofstede (2001) and the 
World Values Survey (2010) affect total tax levels is explored.  The research question 
this paper addresses is: does culture affect total tax effort and the size of the 
governmental sector?  
One of the most fundamental issues confronting a society is the size of the 
governmental sector.  How large should the government be relative to the size of the 
economy?  The nations of the world have crafted many different answers to that question 
as evidenced by the fact that the size of government sectors varies widely.  Likewise, the 
size of the governmental sector can vary during different time periods even within the 
same society, although generally the size of a country‘s governmental sector appears 
relatively fixed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product.  Indeed patterns in relative 
government size in Europe and the Americas observed by Tocqueville (2003) nearly two 
centuries ago are still apparent today.    
 Tax effort and the size of government are important, they matter.  It has been 
recognized at least since Adam Smith (2009) that excessive taxation can be detrimental to 
the economy.  Smith (2009) observed that taxation which is too high is self defeating.  
Optimal tax theory advocates a tax system which imposes as small a tax burden as 
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possible which meets the legitimate needs of government and maximizes the social 
welfare of society (Slemrod 1990). 
Endogenous Growth Theory holds that fiscal and tax policy affects long run 
economic growth (Rebelo 1991).  According to Barro (1990) increases in taxation and 
government spending have two effects on growth.  The increase in taxation reduces 
growth because of the disincentive effects of taxation while the increase in government 
spending raises the marginal productivity of capital and increases growth (Barro 1990).  
Gains from government spending tend to outweigh losses from taxation when 
government is small, according to Barro (1990), while the opposite is true when 
government is large.  Guider (2007) concurs, finding that government size beyond its 
optimal economic enhancing point, is growth inhibiting.  Scully (1994) finds that 
government spending beyond twenty percent of gross domestic product to be 
counterproductive from an economic perspective.  Tax effort which is too low leads to 
weak and unstable governments which are too weak to enforce their own laws.  At the 
extreme, anarchy can result in such situations with weak underfunded governments. This 
was a concern of political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (2009).  Hobbes, the originator of 
social contract theory, advocates strong governmental authority to safeguard against 
disharmony.  Man‘s natural state, according to Hobbes (2009, xviii) is conflict; a ―war of 
all against all,‖ which only a strong government can prevent.  In a similar vein North 
(1991) contends that the rule of law is fundamental to laying the foundation for economic 
development. 
All governments need sufficient revenue in order to function properly.  
Governments of developing nations need additional revenue in order to build much 
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needed infrastructure while the governments of many developed countries need 
additional revenue in order to meet ever mounting social welfare obligations.  The 
governments of Latin American countries, for example are almost without exception 
chronically and materially underfunded.  Indeed, Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Togler 
(2008) contend the situation has persisted for half a century at least.  Significantly less tax 
revenue is collected by countries in the region compared to the rest of the world 
(DataGov 2010).  This leads to a vicious circle in that an underfunded government is a 
weak government and a weak government has less ability to enforce its own laws 
including the collection of tax revenues.  Less tax revenue in turn leads to greater 
weakness.    
 There exists a wide variation in total tax levels among countries.  At the low tax 
extreme countries such as Guatemala can have tax efforts as low as ten percent of GDP 
while at the other extreme high tax countries such as Sweden have tax efforts in excess of 
fifty percent of GDP (World Bank 2010).  Even among OECD nations, substantial 
variation exists, as tax effort among some countries such as Denmark is twice that of 
others, such as South Korea (OECD 2009).  This paper explains the basis for such 
dramatic variation.  Clearly income is part of the explanation with higher income 
countries generally having higher tax efforts than lower income countries.  In this respect 
tax effort, and by implication the government sector, acts as a luxury good in that when 
income increases the size of the government sector increases, in absolute and in relative 
terms.  The demand for luxury goods increase by a greater percentage than income 
increases. 
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The main motivation of this study is to consider the affects of national culture on 
tax effort.  While part of the variation in tax effort and the size of government among 
countries has been explained, much remains unexplained.  This research contributes to 
the literature by explaining more of that difference and by expanding our understanding 
of why some countries are high tax states and others are low tax states. 
 The objective of this paper is to test hypotheses that certain aspects of national 
culture affect tax effort and the size of government.  More specifically the objective of 
this paper is to test the hypothesis that countries with high individualism and collectivism 
have high tax effort and government spending and also to test the hypothesis that 
countries with low masculinity and femininity have high tax effort and government 
spending.  Additional objectives are to test the hypothesis that low power distance is 
associated with high tax effort and government spending and also to test the hypothesis 
that high uncertainty avoidance is associated with high tax effort and high government 
spending.   
Individualism and collectivism relate to the power of the group within society.  In 
collectivist societies the loyalty is to the family, clan, or tribe and not to the nation, or 
society at large.  The opposite is true in individualist societies where loyalty is to society.  
Masculinity and femininity relates to traditional gender roles.  Masculine societies have 
more clearly defined gender roles with men being strong, assertive, and driven by 
achievement and material success while women are modest, caring, and concerned with 
quality of life.  Power distance relates to the manner in which societies deal with human 
inequality.  Societies with higher power distance scores have greater distance between 
classes while those with lower power distance are more egalitarian. Uncertainty 
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avoidance relates to the manner in which a society copes with the uncertainties of life.  
Societies with high levels of uncertainty avoidance have many rules and regulations, both 
formal and informal for dealing with an unpredictable and uncertain future (Hofstede 
2001).   
A further objective is to test the cultural dimensions observed by Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005) from World Values Survey (2010) data, specifically to test the hypothesis 
that countries with high scores on the traditional versus secular rational cultural 
dimension have high tax effort and government spending and also to test the hypothesis 
that countries with high levels on the survivalist versus self expression cultural dimension 
have high tax effort and government spending.  Testing the World Values Survey cultural 
dimensions will be done in order to confirm the findings observed from the Hofstede 
cultural variable tests.    
The traditional versus secular rational dimension reflects the importance of 
traditional beliefs to society.  Strongly traditional societies are deferential to authority, 
view religion as very important in their lives, have strong family ties with well defined 
roles, are nationalistic, and have limited tolerance for others.  Societies which have high 
secular rational values are less deferential to authority, view religion as less important, 
are less nationalistic, and have greater tolerance for others.  The survivalist versus self 
expression cultural dimension reflects the transition from industrial society to post-
industrial or knowledge society.  In industrial societies, the emphasis is on economic and 
physical security while in knowledge societies, the emphasis shifts to individual well 
being, self expression, and the quality of life.  Countries with high self expression values 
place a strong emphasis on participation in political and economic decision making, 
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gender equality, and individual freedoms and are generally tolerant of other cultures 
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005). 
Stated formally, the alternative or research hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: There is a direct relationship between Individualism and collectivism and tax 
effort.                 
H2: There is a direct relationship between Masculinity and femininity and tax 
effort. 
H3: There is a direct relationship between Power Distance and tax effort. 
H4: There is a direct relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and tax effort. 
H5: There is a direct relationship between Traditional versus Secular Rational 
values and tax effort. 
H6: There is a direct relationship between Survivalist versus Self Expression 
values and tax effort.  
Tsakumis, Curatola, and Porcano (2007) are the first to utilize Hofstede‘s cultural 
framework in an analysis of tax policy differences among nations.  The authors find that 
the variation in tax evasion among countries is indeed related to Hofstede‘s cultural 
framework.  In other words, culture matters at the national level at least with respect to 
tax evasion.  Richardson (2008) in an expanded study also finds that culture matters at the 
national level with respect to tax evasion.    
Pooled least squares regression is utilized to empirically test the main hypotheses 
of the study.   Pooled least squares regression is appropriate whenever independently 
sampled cross sections are obtained from large populations at different points in time 
(Wooldridge 2006).  Since the World Values Survey (2010) is conducted in such a 
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manner, pooled least squares is appropriate.  Likewise, for comparative purposes, the 
Hofstede (2001) cultural dimensions are analyzed utilizing the same methodology.  
This paper proceeds as follows; following the Introduction, Chapter Two consists 
of a review of the related literature.  Included in Chapter Two is the theoretical 
foundation for the study.  Chapter Three details the data, variables, and hypotheses 
utilized, while the following chapter, Chapter Four, reports the statistical methods used 
and results of the analysis.  Finally, Section Five is a brief Conclusion.  Included in the 
conclusion is a discussion of the limitations of the study as well as suggestions for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
This chapter proceeds as follows: the first section is a discussion of tax effort and 
the closely related size of government.  Included in this section are a number of studies 
related to known or hypothesized determinants of tax effort.  Relying mostly on the work 
of Geertz (1973) and Hofstede (2001), the following section defines culture as it is used 
in this paper.  Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural dimensions are the subject of the next section, 
followed by a section describing modernization theory.  Modernization theory provides a 
theoretical foundation for the use of national cultural variables.  The relationship between 
culture and economics is covered in the next section which is followed by a section 
discussing the relationship between culture and taxation.  A brief discussion of optimal 
taxation is the subject of the next section.  The chapter concludes with a brief summary of 
the theoretical foundation for the paper.    
Tax Effort and the Size of Government 
 Fairly extensive literature exists regarding the size of government. Alesina and 
Spolaore (1997) contend that country size is the primary determinate of the size of 
government.  Smaller countries in terms of population have larger governments in 
relative terms when measured as a percentage of GDP.  This finding confirms the 
assumption that there are fixed costs associated with government. 
 A country‘s state of development has long been recognized as having a significant 
effect on the size of the governmental sector.  More developed countries and countries 
with higher per capita income have larger tax efforts (total tax collected divided by GDP) 
and have larger governments in relative as well as in absolute terms.  Further, as a 
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country develops and its per capita income increases, the relative size of its government 
increases as well.  This phenomenon is referred to as Wagner‘s Law after the German 
economist Adolph Wagner, who developed the theory in the 1880‘s (Tullock 1993).   
Wagner‘s Law has been largely confirmed by the historical development of Europe 
(Meltzer & Richard 1981) and the United States (North & Wallis 1982), although Tullock 
(1993) cautions that there have been significant periods of time when economic 
development occurred which lack the predicted increase in government.   
 Trade openness is also thought by many to have an effect on the size of 
government (Cameron 1978).  Although Alesina and Waciarg (1998) note the 
interconnectedness of trade openness and government size, they are reluctant to proclaim 
cause and effect.  Rodrik (1998) has no such reluctance; he argues that trade openness 
results in larger government.  According to Rodrik countries which are open to 
international trade are subject to external shocks, and accordingly, need larger 
governmental sectors to compensate.  Rodrik finds a correlation between trade openness 
and the size of government which is not sensitive to changes in the measure of 
government size and applies to both high and low income countries (Rodrik 1998).  In a 
contrary viewpoint, Benarroch and Panday (2008) utilize panel data and find no 
relationship between trade openness and government size and Ferris (2003) cautions 
about the use of alternative measures of the size of government.    
 Cameron (1978) shows that the level of trade openness in 1960 of OECD 
countries is an excellent predictor (R
2
= .78) of subsequent increases in government tax 
revenue.  Kimakova (2009) contends that financial openness is also associated with 
government size.  Greater exposure to international capital flows, results in larger 
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governments.  In the face of economic globalization, Bhagwati (2007) advocates that 
governments should become larger in order to compensate the losers from trade reform, 
keeping in mind that while trade may be beneficial to the country as a whole, some 
sectors, firms, and individuals exposed to foreign competition may be harmed.  Winners 
from trade are the consumers who are able to purchase cheaper imported goods and the 
producers that make goods for export.  Losers from trade are those producers who are 
faced with competition from foreign producers as well as consumers in the exporting 
countries who must pay more for the good. Garrett contends the effects of globalization 
on government spending are more pronounced for developing countries (Garrett 2001).      
 Expansion of voting rights is also thought by many theorists to result in increased 
taxation and government spending.  Meltzer and Richard (1981) argue that expansions of 
the voting franchise invariably add lower income voters who tend to favor income 
redistribution policies.  The researchers are reiterating an observation made by 
Tocqueville nearly two centuries ago (Tocqueville 1965).  In partial confirmation, Husted 
and Kenny (1997) find that the elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests in several U.S. 
states by the mid 1960‘s resulted in an increase in demand for welfare and other transfer 
payments but did not result in an increase in demand for governmental services.  A 
similar finding is evident in ten Western European countries from 1860 to 1938 
(Aidtyand & Jensenz 2009). 
 Many other explanations for the size of government have been offered with 
varying degrees of empirical support.  Voter demographics may play a role for example.  
Becker (1983) and Becker and Mulligan (2003) argue that as a population ages, political 
pressure grows to increase social security benefits and to transfer the tax burden from 
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taxes on capital to taxes on labor.  Becker and Mulligan (2003) point to the work of 
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) who find that U.S. government spending on the 
elderly increased from 1.1% to 8.8% of GDP in the second half of the 20th century while 
non-elderly government spending stayed relatively constant at around 25% of GDP.  This 
is a manifestation of Schumpeter‘s ―lobby of the old‖ (Schumpeter 1991, 377).  Others 
however, have reached contrary conclusions about the elderly political clout in the United 
States and Western Europe with respect to government spending and taxation (Razin, 
Sadka, & Swagel 2002). 
 The number of legislators a government has may influence tax levels and overall 
government spending.  Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnson (1981) formulate a model of 
government spending and observe a positive relationship between ‗seats and spending‘ in 
unicameral legislatures.  Chen and Malhotra (2007) extend the Weingast model to 
bicameral legislatures and analyze data from the United States Senate.  Various 
constitutional provisions also affect the size of government according to Persson and 
Taballini (2004) although their conclusion has been challenged (Acemoglu 2005). 
 Democracy seems to lead to a larger government and higher taxation (Alesina, 
Spolaore, & Wacziarg 2000).  Further, the form of democracy appears to matter as well 
with parliamentary systems resulting in higher taxes and more government spending than 
presidential type systems (Persson & Tabellini 2004).  Political competition, defined as 
the absence of monopoly or near monopoly power by one political party, seems to lower 
tax levels (Besley, Persson, & Sturm 2005) while political instability seems to increase 
spending (Annett 2001), an observation once noted by Aristotle (Mahon 2004).  At the 
opposite extreme from high tax states are low tax states which are more commonly 
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referred to as states suffering from low tax effort.  Low tax effort is a hallmark of many 
countries, especially those in Latin America, suggesting that culture may play a role.   
 All governments need sufficient revenue in order to properly function.  
Governments of developing nations need additional revenue in order to build needed 
infrastructure.  Some countries and regions do better collecting sufficient tax revenue 
than others.  Among others, the governments of Latin America, for example are almost 
without exception chronically and materially underfunded (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & 
Togler 2008).  This leads to a vicious circle in that an underfunded government is a weak 
government, and a weak government has less ability to enforce its own laws including the 
collection of tax revenues.  Less tax revenue in turn leads to greater weakness.    
Countries with high levels of income inequality also tend to be weak states which 
oscillate between dictatorship and fragile democracy according to Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001).  The authors cite Argentina as an example which shifted seven times 
from dictatorship to democracy or vice-versa in the twentieth century.  Argentina‘s 
income inequality, as measured by its Gini coefficient is 51 according to the World Bank 
(2011).  By way of comparison high income countries have an average Gini coefficient of 
35, South Asian countries 37 and Middle Eastern Countries 39.  Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2001) speculate that low tax effort may result in such countries as a safeguard against 
coup d‘état. 
Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Togler (2008) theorize that low tax effort countries 
lack a social contract between the state and its citizens.  Such a social contract is the 
foundation of a properly functioning tax system.  The authors also speculate that political 
will is necessary for tax reform, a view shared by Stein (2005).  Bowler and Donovan 
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(1995) provide empirical evidence of voters linking dissatisfaction with government to 
dissatisfaction with taxation.  Accordingly, better government may result in better tax 
collection and higher tax effort.  
    Moore (2004) contends that the source of governmental revenue has a dramatic 
effect on state behavior.  In other words, the quality of governance is better when the 
state depends upon its citizens for revenue.  Moore (2004) points to historical examples 
as well as the modern day examples of Poland and Russia.  Upon the fall of communism, 
Poland instituted a broadly based tax system and is more responsive to its citizens while 
Russia has relied upon the taxation of natural resources for its revenue and is less 
responsive.  Responsive government, according to Bird, Martinez-Vazques, and Togler 
(2008, 58) is, ―an essential precondition for a more adequate level of tax effort.‖   
 A country‘s inability to collect sufficient tax revenue results in significant budget 
deficits which add to the national debt.  Greater amounts of debt in turn lead to greater 
interest obligations which further strain government finances (Offerdal 2004).  
Additionally, in an attempt to increase revenue collections, low tax effort governments 
have imposed some of the most economically distorting types of taxes.  According to 
Hubbard (2002, 21) ―governments are tempted to turn to schemes that secure revenue 
despite their inefficiency and broad cost to the economy.‖  Latin American governments 
for example have imposed such distortive taxes as taxes on corporate assets, equity, 
minimum income, and bank transaction taxes (Muniz 2006).  Although all taxes create 
deadweight losses, these taxes are thought to be associated with especially large losses of 
welfare over and above the amount of the tax collected.  A minimum income tax is a tax 
on deemed income which is typically calculated assuming a fixed return on revenues, 
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equity, or assets.  A bank transaction tax is a tax on a specific type of financial 
transaction such as a bank deposit, transfer, or check.  Although they have been reduced 
by considerable margins throughout much of the world; trade inhibiting tariffs and export 
duties have remained high in the region.  Indeed, international trade taxes in Latin 
America as a percentage of total tax revenue are nearly six times as high as they are in 
Eastern and Central Europe and over 40 times higher than in the industrialized nations of 
the world (Inter-American Development Bank 2010).  Distortive taxes, as well as high 
taxation of international trade, inhibit economic activity, and accordingly, reduce growth.  
 Both Acemoglu (2005) and Sindzingre (2007) believe that the very essence of a 
state is defined by its ability to tax.  Weak states according to Sindzingre (2007) are those 
that lack the power, will, or credibility to stand up to political challenges and impose 
taxation on their own citizens.  Bergman (2002) contends that historically, monarchs and 
governments have risen and fallen based on their ability to collect sufficient revenues 
from their subjects. 
Definition of Culture 
 Any study which utilizes culture as an explanatory variable must take great care 
in defining precisely what ‗culture‘ means.  Culture is, after all, a term which has been 
defined by scholars literally hundreds of times (Kuper 1999).  It has become, according to 
Kuper an overused catch all phrase with multiple meanings subject to manipulation by 
scholars.  Indeed, Kuper (1999) documents some 157 definitions of culture used by 
American anthropologists between 1920 and 1950 alone.  Still, a consensus on culture‘s 
definition has emerged (Kuper 1999).  According to the consensus view culture is learned 
not innate; not a matter of race or ethnicity and involves ideas and values.  Further the 
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consensus holds that aspects of culture are common to all mankind and that mankind‘s 
common culture has advanced over very long periods of time (Kuper 1999).    
 Geertz (1977) favors what he terms the classical definition of culture.  Culture, to 
Geertz consists of the knowledge, beliefs, law, morals, and customs of a people.  
Concurring with Geertz‘ definition of culture is Kuper (1999) who adds only the 
importance of tradition to the definition.  Culture can also be thought of as a defense 
against human nature since culture acts as a constraint against inappropriate action 
according to Geertz (1977).     
 Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) consider culture to be a broadly defined collective 
phenomenon.  They state that ―culture consists of the unwritten rules of the social game.  
It is the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group 
or category of people from others‖ (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005, 4).  Culture, to the 
Hofstede‘s is acquired over a person‘s lifetime with much of it learned during childhood.  
Culture rests between human nature and individual personality.  
 Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) also contend that multiple levels of culture exist.  
Those levels consist of a national level; a regional and/or ethnic and/or religious and/or 
linguistic level; a gender level; a generational level; a social class level and for those 
employed an organizational, departmental and/or corporate level.   
 Hofstede‘s survey finds no evidence of cultural convergence and little support for 
Huntington‘s multiple civilization hypotheses (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005).  Huntington 
(1993 and 1996) argues that civilizations are cultures writ large and as such are the 
primary factor in international affairs.  Hofstede‘s multinational surveys do not however 
support Huntington‘s conclusion rather they find significant attitudinal differences among 
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nations within the same civilization (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005).  Indeed, Hofstede‘s 
culture dimensions show little apparent civilization based pattern.  For example, in the 
masculinity and femininity cultural dimension a European Union country, Slovakia 
scores highest while another European Union country, Sweden finishes lowest.  Likewise 
in the power distance cultural dimension a Central American nation, Panama scores 
second highest while its next door neighbor, Costa Rica has nearly the lowest observed 
score.  Only in individualism and power distance are some of Huntington‘s civilization 
patterns apparent.  Western nations generally score high on individualism and low on 
masculinity relative to the rest of the world, although even there exceptions exist 
(Hofstede & Hofstede 2005).  Conversely, Inglehart‘s mapping of cultural values from 
the World Values Survey seems to confirm Huntington‘s eight or nine civilizations, at 
least to a limited extent (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).   
 Disputing Huntington‘s civilization theory is Wei-Ming (2000) who argues that 
American culture differs sufficiently from European culture and that merging them into 
one Western culture is erroneous.  Further, Wei-Ming contends that even within Europe 
the cultures and historical experiences of Britain, France, and Germany are so 
significantly different that generalization is impossible.  Hofstede (2001) concurs, finding 
vast cultural differences even among geographic neighbors in Europe.  Even Britain itself 
is by no means a monolithic culture (Sowell 1996).  Likewise Reid (2007) finds vast 
cultural differences among Latin American countries.  Panama, Costa Rica, and 
Nicaragua, for example differ significantly culturally.    
 Harrison and Huntington (2000) concur with Hofstede (2001) that cultures 
typically change only very slowly over time.  They point out however, that sometimes 
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dramatic changes in culture can occur; citing post World War II Japan and Germany as 
examples of cultures which experienced rapid change.  Schumpeter (1991) also concurs, 
finding a historic aversion to change among peoples and concluding that aversion to 
change must be part of human nature.  The fact that national culture is generally fixed 
over relatively long periods of time justifies the use of measures of national culture 
collected over extended periods of time.  
 Campbell (2004) maintains that cultures and institutions typically change very 
slowly over time in most circumstances, even when faced with significant external 
pressures.  Campbell, in a study of tax systems throughout the world finds globalization 
has little effect on tax culture or institutions.  Huntington (1993 and 1996) concurs, 
arguing that civilizations and cultures are not converging toward a common or universal 
culture.  
 Inglehart and Baker (2000) view culture as being path dependent, a view shared 
by Campbell (2004).  The authors also argue that causality between culture and 
economics is difficult to ascertain.  Inglehart and Baker (2000) like Weber (2003) view 
cultural change as being necessary for economic development.  In other words, the 
developing world must adopt modern cultural values in order to economically develop.  
Traditional cultural values, according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005), act as a deterrent to 
economic development.    
 Fukuyama (2002) sees such things as: truth telling, meeting obligations, and 
reciprocity as being productive or useful cultural values.  These values incidentally 
correspond closely to Weber‘s Protestant Work Ethic (Weber 2003).  The Protestant 
Reformation was of critical importance, according to Weber because it extended honesty 
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and reciprocity beyond the family to society at large.  That expansion was necessary for 
the subsequent development of both capitalism and democracy (Weber 2003).  
Paradoxically strong family ties are detrimental to modern society according to 
Fukuyama (2000).  Fukuyama cites China and Latin America as examples where strong 
family ties interfering with societal interactions.  Likewise Putnam (1993) cites southern 
Italy as a region negatively impacted by strong family ties.    
Hofstede‘s Cultural Dimensions 
 This paper relies on Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural dimensions.  Hofstede contends 
that national cultures exist and that those differences are significant enough to matter to 
many things, including tax policy (Hofstede 2001).  Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) define 
culture as ‗collective mental programming‘ which is shared by all members of a nation, 
region, or group.  According to Hofstede (2004), culture at its deepest level, is 
unconscious and not open to discussion.  It is also relatively fixed over long periods of 
time.  Hofstede (2001) identified four cultural dimensions from data collected from IBM 
employees spread throughout the world.  The four cultural dimensions are: power 
distance; uncertainty avoidance; individualism and collectivism, and masculinity and 
femininity.  A fifth cultural dimension, long term versus short term was subsequently 
identified from further surveying. 
 Four of Hofstede‘s five cultural dimensions appear to be directly applicable to a 
country‘s level of tax effort.  Individualism and collectivism is the first such dimension.  
At the extreme, countries with high scores on individualism are more loosely organized 
with a large amount of individual freedom, while high collectivism societies are more 
cloistered with the family, the clan, or the local tribe being the dominant cultural feature.  
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Collectivism has been identified as being associated with undesirable social and 
economic outcomes.  Individualistic societies tend to be more open and allow for greater 
social mobility.  Individualistic societies are more concerned with the individual while 
collectivist societies are concerned with the group. Loyalty to society, associated with 
high individualist societies, should be associated with a willingness to pay higher taxes 
for the benefit of society. 
 The second Hofstede cultural dimension hypothesized to be related to a country‘s 
level of tax effort is what Hofstede calls masculinity and femininity.  In high masculine 
societies typical masculine values predominate.  Such things as showing off, valuing 
outward appearances, and performing are stressed.  In more feminine societies traditional 
feminine values are more important.  Relationship building, cooperation, modesty, and 
the quality of life are important in such societies.  Feminine societies tend to be more 
modern while masculine societies tend to be more traditional.  Sweden and the 
Netherlands are examples of feminine societies while Spain and Argentina are examples 
of masculine societies. The greater concern for other members of society observed in 
more feminine societies should translate into a greater willingness to submit to taxation, 
and accordingly, such societies should have higher tax efforts. 
The third Hofstede cultural dimension hypothesized to be related to tax effort is 
power distance.  Power distance relates to the manner in which societies deal with human 
inequality.  Inequality among individuals is explicit in the superior subordinate 
relationship.  Inequality also can be related to physical or mental characteristics, social 
standing, prestige, income, wealth, power, age, or occupation (Hofstede 2001).  Societies 
in which power distance is great are termed elitist while those with little distance between 
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social levels are considered pluralist.  Power distance scores of countries are consistent 
over time as trend data, according to Hofstede (2001), indicates no evidence of 
significant movement.  In societies with high power distance, there is a large gap in social 
standing between those with prestige and those without, while in countries with low 
power distance scores, the gap is minimal.  Countries with high power distance scores 
include Malaysia, as well as most Arab and many Latin American countries.  Countries 
with low power distance include many European states as well as Costa Rica.  Pluralist or 
low power distance societies should be associated with a greater willingness to submit to 
taxation and, accordingly, higher tax effort.   
The fourth and final Hofstede cultural dimension hypothesized to be related to tax 
effort is uncertainty avoidance.  Uncertainty avoidance is a cultural coping mechanism 
which compensates for the anxiety associated with an unpredictable and uncertain future 
(Hofstede 2001).  Societies throughout the world have developed diverse strategies for 
dealing with uncertainty.  The name as well as the theoretical basis is from Cyert and 
March (1963).  Uncertainty avoidance is manifested through technology, laws, and 
religious practices (Hofstede 2001).  Coping with the inevitable uncertainty of life is a 
non-rational process with deep historical roots according to Hofstede (2001).  Strong 
uncertainty avoidance is associated with rigid rules and regulations.  Rules and 
regulations can be either formal or informal.  Countries with high levels of uncertainty 
avoidance include Greece, Portugal, and Guatemala.  Countries with low levels of 
uncertainty avoidance include Singapore, Jamaica, and Denmark (Hofstede 2001).  A 
higher level of uncertainty avoidance should be associated with a greater demand for 
government and, accordingly such societies should be associated with higher tax efforts.       
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Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions have been used to explain national differences in a 
wide range of social, political, and economic phenomena.  The cultural dimensions have 
also been used to explain differences in such diverse things as union membership rates 
(Singh 2001), antibiotic use (Deschepper 2008), and the use of video-conferencing 
(Dustdar 1999).  This paper extends usage of Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions to tax effort 
and the size of government.    
Franke, Hofstede, and Bond (2001) find that variation in national cultural 
attributes explains a large share of differences in economic growth among countries.  The 
authors analyze a sample of 18 countries over two time periods and find that both certain 
cultural values and beliefs are conducive toward growth. 
Ding, Jean, and Stolowy (2005) utilize Hofstede‘s cultural variables to show that 
cultural factors contribute toward the differences in national accounting practices.  In a 
sample of 52 countries with individually articulated national accounting principles the 
authors find that culture matters more to accounting policy divergence than does legal 
origin.  Likewise Lewis (2001) utilizes information from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and finds a statistically significant relationship between Hofstede‘s 
individualism cultural dimension and national income measurement practices.  The 
finding confirms Gray‘s (1988) theory that national culture affects national accounting 
principles and practices. 
Hope et al (2008) find that cultural factors, as measured by Hofstede, have an 
effect on firms‘ choice of auditor.  Using a very large sample of firms from 37 countries, 
the authors find that firms from countries with high levels of power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance and low levels of individualism are less likely to hire a big 4 
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auditor after controlling for various firm attributes.  In a similar study, Tsakumis (2007) 
finds that national culture as measured by Hofstede is a determinant of differences in 
willingness to disclose adverse information in accounting statement footnotes.  Likewise, 
Chan, Lin, and Mo (2003) find a correlation between Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions and 
the magnitude of accounting errors discovered during financial statement audits.  Tsui 
and Windsor (2001) find that Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions are associated with 
differences in ethical reasoning among auditors in Australia and China.   
Husted (1999) finds that Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions impact corruption levels 
after controlling for national wealth, income distribution, and government size.  
Specifically high scores on power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance are all 
significantly correlated with high levels of corruption. 
Modernization Theory 
 Providing a theoretical foundation for the divergence of national cultures 
observed by Hofstede (2001) is Modernization Theory.  The key tenant of Modernization 
Theory is that socioeconomic progress brings with it, significant and fundamental cultural 
change (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  When a society develops and modernizes 
fundamental changes occur in its cultural values and beliefs.  It is a contention which has 
strong empirical support.  The empirical support is provided by World Values Survey 
(Inglehart 2010).  The World Values Survey is a series of national level personal opinion 
surveys conducted in many countries throughout the world every five years or so.  The 
initial survey was conducted in 1981 and covered 24 mostly European countries.  The 
most recently completed survey started in 2005 and covered over 80 nations throughout 
the world.  Those nations represent nearly 85 percent of the world‘s population.  The 
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surveys are intended to provide information on the values and beliefs of the world‘s 
inhabitants.  The surveys grew out of the European Values Survey and are conducted 
under the direction of Ronald Inglehart of the Institute of Social Research at the 
University of Michigan. 
 Inglehart and Welzel (2005) contend that values and beliefs are of crucial 
importance.  Indeed, values and beliefs shape and define human behavior.  The 
researchers also see fundamental changes occurring to the belief systems of people 
throughout the world.  Those changes are primarily driven by socioeconomic 
development.  Cultural changes are not random but neither are they linear, rather cultural 
change occurs in fits and starts.  Based on the analysis of World Values Survey data, 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 15) conclude: 
-There is a wide diversity of cultural values throughout the world.  Core beliefs 
and values differ greatly between nations and groups of nations.  This is 
especially true of differences between the developed world and the developing 
world.  
-Cultural values change but they do so in a largely predictable pattern.  Cultural 
change is mostly dependent upon socioeconomic development with changes in the 
composition of the labor force sector being the most important determinate. 
-Changing cultural values have important consequences at the societal level with 
respect to governance, equality, the rule of law, and democracy. 
-At any given point in time, a society‘s culture is shaped by the interaction of 
changes brought about by socioeconomic development and the society‘s historic 
cultural traditions. 
24 
 
 
-Cultures change, but they do so in a path dependent manner.  A society‘s cultural 
traditions limit the range of cultural change.   
-Cultural differences among nations are robust and endure over time.  There is no 
evidence of worldwide cultural homogenization.  Cultural differences among 
nations are as great in 2001 as they were in 1981.   
The common theme of changing values and beliefs throughout all societies of the 
world is the striving for greater individual autonomy and personal choice (Inglehart & 
Welzel 2005).  As socioeconomic development occurs, material, social, and cognitive 
constraints on human activity are lessened (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  Development 
literally expands the range of human thought, according to the authors.  This view is 
supported by data from the World Values Survey.   
The World Values Survey has been utilized by researchers in a number of fields.  
Data from the surveys has been used in a wide range of studies including such diverse 
areas as preferences for trade protection (Mayda & Rodrik 2005), the gender gap in math 
scores (Guizo et al 2008)  and the incidence of violent crime (Lederman, Loayza, & 
Menendez 2002).   
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) find that culture affects economic 
outcomes.  Utilizing World Value Survey data, the authors first show culture has an 
effect on preferences for redistribution.  The authors then provide evidence that 
preferences for redistribution have an effect on actual redistribution and taxation policies 
in a study of U.S. states.  In an earlier study Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) find an 
association between culture; again as measured by the World Values Survey and national 
savings and investment.     
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Tabellini (2010) finds culture as measured by the World Values Survey to be 
associated with GDP per capita as well as economic growth.  Granato, Inglehart, and 
Leblang (1996) reach a similar conclusion also utilizing the World Values Survey data. 
 In a study of tax morale in Latin America Togler (2005) finds that aspects of 
national culture as measured by the World Values Survey are major factors in 
determining the willingness to comply with tax laws.  A similar finding is reported by 
Alm and Togler (2005) in a study of tax morale in the United States and Europe. 
Taking a somewhat contrary position, Harrison (2006) argues that politics, or 
more specifically political will, can change national cultures.  He cites Singapore and 
Chile as examples where strong political leadership committed to change has had 
dramatic affects on the national culture and prosperity.    
 Conceptually, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) see a two-stage process that societies 
undergo in their transition from traditional to modern.  In the first stage, the society‘s 
economy transitions from being based on agriculture to becoming more industrialized.  
At this stage of development rationalizations, secularizations, and bureaucratization of 
society occur.  This process is accompanied by a lessening in the importance of 
traditional values and beliefs, including a lessening in the importance of God.  Indeed, 
among the developing nations of the world, God is important on a daily basis by up to 
ninety five percent of the population in some countries but as little as three percent in 
some highly developed nations (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).    
 The historic development of modernization theory can be traced to 18th century 
French mathematician, philosopher, and economist Marquis de Condorcet and the Age of 
Enlightenment (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  De Condorcet was the first to write of the 
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idea of progress.  The expansion of knowledge, de Condorcet contends, will act to 
expand material well being, political freedom, and virtue.  Progress leads to the inevitable 
perfection of humankind, according to de Condorcet (Acton 2007).  Notable theorists 
Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Max Weber also contributed to Modernization Theory 
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  While they offer decidedly differing interpretations of 
modernization, each sees technological innovation and socioeconomic development as 
having profound effects on humankind‘s cultural values.  Among the first theories of 
economic development was the idea that the traditional values of poor societies needed to 
be changed in order for those societies to develop.  In other words, cultural change will 
lead to economic growth and development.  Rostow (1959) as well as Almond and 
Coleman (1960), and Pye and Verba (1969), all make such arguments.  Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005), based on their analysis of World Values Survey data, find that it is 
economic development which causes cultural change.         
Broadly defined, the two stages of transition from traditional to modern can be 
depicted as follows: 
Stage 1: Industrialization results in a transition from traditional values to secular rational 
values. 
Stage 2: Post-Industrial Modernization results in a transition from survivalist values to 
self expression values. 
 According to the world cultural map (Inglehart & Welzel 2005) Zimbabwe and 
Morocco are examples of traditional societies.  They have yet to industrialize and 
accordingly are pre-stage one.  As such they have strong traditional and survivalist 
values.  Russia and Bulgaria are examples of countries which have completed stage one.  
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They are industrialized societies which score strong in secular rational values but weak in 
self expression values.  Japan and Norway are examples of countries which have 
completed both stages.  Their societies have strong secular rational values and strong self 
expressionist values. 
 In general all societies are currently in the process of cultural change, some on a 
massive scale, with the most developed nations of the world undergoing the greatest 
degree of change in values and beliefs (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  The percentage of the 
labor force employed in the industrial sector appears to have the strongest effect on a 
society‘s cultural values.  A preindustrial society with most of its labor force employed in 
agriculture has strong traditional values.  As a society industrializes and the size of the 
labor force devoted to industry grows, the values of society gradually shift to become 
more secular-rational and less traditional.  This value shift does not increase individual 
autonomy but rather replaces the authority of God and of organized religion with the 
authority of technology, science, and the organized industrial sector.  There is no loss of 
authority when cultural values shift from traditional to secular-rational; it is the nature of 
the authority which undergoes change (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). 
 It is the second stage of cultural transition where respect for authority diminishes.  
When societies transition from industrial to post-industrial cultural values begin to shift 
from survivalist to self-expression (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  Respect for authority 
diminishes and many key institutions of industrial society are eroded as individual 
autonomy increases.  The second stage of cultural transition occurs once the economy 
evolves from its industrial base to become a service based economy.  The percentage of 
the labor force employed in the industrial sector declines and employment in the service 
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sector increases.  Inglehart and Welzel (2005) theorize that the knowledge based 
economy significantly increases the range of human interactions.  This in turn has 
significant effects on cultural values and beliefs.   
 Self expression values, contrary to the implication of their name are not self or 
ego-centric, but rather are humanistic.  Such values are people centered and are 
concerned with individual autonomy expanding personal freedom (Inglehart & Welzel 
2005).   
 Although cultural values are changing throughout the world, they are doing so 
very gradually (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  Cultural values, to a great extent are 
determined early in life and largely reflect prevailing conditions in society.  Contrary to 
prevailing views, survey data indicates that cultural values do not change much over a 
person‘s lifetime.  Accordingly, societal cultural values and beliefs change only as one 
generation is replaced by the next (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  Accordingly, the World 
Values Survey lends some credibility to Hofstede‘s (2001) contention that cultural 
changes occur slowly and gradually and therefore cultural scores obtained from the IBM 
surveys maintain their original usefulness.  Adding further credence is Inglehart and 
Welzel‘s (2005) observation that all or virtually all societies in the world are undergoing 
cultural change and further that those changes are all in the same direction.  Cultural 
changes observed by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) are from traditional values to secular 
rational and from survivalist to self expressionist.     
 Inglehart and Welzel (2005) contend that there is a certain evolutionary logic 
associated with cultural change, a view shared by Porter (2000).  Cultures change, only 
when there is a compelling reason for them to do so.  Socioeconomic development is by 
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far the most compelling reason for a culture to change.  It is not however the only reason 
cultures change as a significant portion of cultural change remains unexplained (Inglehart 
& Welzel 2005).      
 Conceptually the idea of progress is a relatively recent phenomenon.  Sustained 
economic growth, where production growth exceeded population growth, created the 
revolutionary concept of human progress (North & Thomas 1973).  Prior to that 
occurrence, survival and avoiding starvation were humankind‘s primary if not exclusive 
priorities.  The simple fact that most people in the Western world, for the last five 
hundred years or so, wake up with the notion that they will not starve to death that day is 
unique in human history and further, has profound implications on cultural values and 
beliefs (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 23), 
―throughout history, survival has been precarious and human choice has been restricted 
for most people,‖ it is only with the advent of socioeconomic development that 
humankind has been liberated from such severe constraints.   Socioeconomic 
development has lessened material, social, and cognitive constrains on humans, and it has 
greatly expanded the realm of possibilities (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).      
Culture and Economics 
 That culture matters to economics is a controversial contention.  Many 
economists, for a variety of reasons, do not like culture as an explanation for economic 
phenomenon.  However, Hojman (1999) in an extensive review of the literature notes that 
there is now a substantial body of literature which posits the view that culture has a direct 
effect on economics, Gereffi (1989), Lobkowski (1991), Inglehart and Baker (2000), 
Montaner (2000), Fukuyama (2002), Bergman (2002 and 2003),You and Khagram 
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(2005), Guiso (2006), and Tabillini (2010)  concur.  Fukuyama (2002) contends that in 
the past cultural explanations have been abused, while Olson (1996) maintains that the 
concept of culture is too vague and accordingly does not lend itself toward fitting into 
production functions.  Obviously a variable must be quantified in order to be measured or 
to fit into an econometric model, which undoubtedly contributes to culture‘s lack of 
widespread use among economists.  However, Schumpeter reminds us that economists 
should not ignore a phenomenon simply because it is difficult to measure (Schumpeter 
1991).  An additional factor may be as Sowell (2008) maintains, there is reluctance on the 
part of researchers of pointing to culture as an explanation of the differences in 
performance between countries or between groups because they do not want to be 
accused of blaming the victim. 
 Still, culture appears to offer substantial explanation for many economic 
phenomena and it is growing in acceptance among economists (Guiso, Sapienza, & 
Zingales 2006).  Guiso et al. (2006) notes that concepts of culture and economics were 
originally closely linked by, among others, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill.  However, 
they also caution that combining economics with cultural concepts brings with it the 
problem of causality.             
Assuming culture does have an effect on economics, the question remains: what is 
the mechanism by which culture affects economics?  In other words, how does culture 
either benefit or hinder economics?  Theorists have a wide range of views on the subject.  
Fukuyama (2002) contends that culture is the predominant component of social capital 
and that social capital is important to economic development.  Hojman (1999) is 
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convinced culture effects attitudes toward such things as work, innovation, savings, and 
profits.  Landes (1999), not to mention Weber (2003), concur.    
According to Huntington, culture must be at least partially responsible for the vast 
differences in development between the developing and developed worlds (Harrison & 
Huntington 2000).  Harrison (1985) finds that aspects of Latin American‘s culture are 
detrimental to its growth and development.  Latin American culture differs from North 
American culture according to Harrison (1985) in its time orientation, work ethic, 
frugality, education, merit, ethics and corruption, justice, and secularism.      
 Huntington (1996) contends Russia‘s Orthodox culture inhibits its economic 
growth.  Likewise Islamic culture in the Middle East hinders its economic development 
according to Huntington (1996).  Sachs (2000) disagrees, finding no evidence Muslim 
societies are at a disadvantage economically after controlling for economic policies and 
geography.  Cameron and Neal (2003) concur, finding that historically Islam has been 
favorably disposed toward merchants and trade.  Hourani (1991) agrees noting the 
expansion of international trade and the proliferation of merchants, craftsmen, and 
scholars which coincided with the creation of the Muslim empire.    
 There are many examples of minority cultural groups thriving within an otherwise 
poorly functioning economic system.  Both Sowell (1996 and 2008) and Harrison and 
Huntington (2000) discuss multiple examples of economically successful minority groups 
such as the Chinese in South East Asia, the Japanese in Brazil, the Ibo‘s in Nigeria, the 
Indians in East Africa, the Lebanese in West Africa, and the Jews in many locations.  
Although the economically successful minority groups are geographically and otherwise 
diverse, Sowell (1996) finds that they have much in common regarding their views on 
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hard work, thrift, and sobriety.  Weber (2003) offers at least a partial explanation for the 
phenomenon when he observes that minority groups are often excluded from the political 
process and driven into (lowly regarded) economic activity in order to survive.    
 Landes (1996) discusses a couple of paradox to the culture matters argument.  The 
first paradox is that if culture matters then why have the Chinese been so successful 
abroad and so unsuccessful, until recently, at home?  The second paradox is if culture 
matters then why have the Chinese been so unsuccessful for so long and lately so 
successful?  Sachs (2000) reiterates by pointing to China‘s explosive growth since its 
economic opening in 1978 as evidence that it is policy and not culture that matters to 
economics.  However, rather than indicate that culture does not matter to economics, it is 
much more likely that other factors, in addition to culture, matter as well.  Porter (2000) 
concurs, maintaining that the proper macroeconomic policies are a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for growth.  
Also potentially weakening the culture matters to economics argument is the fact 
that many widely diverse cultures have achieved economic development.  Japan, the 
Asian Tigers as well as, to a lesser extent Chile, Costa Rico, Barbados, and Botswana are 
all examples of non-Western economic success stories.  However, Sowell (1996) notes 
many cultural similarities among economically successful nations, especially with respect 
to such things as work ethic, frugality, and education which transcend national cultures.   
While Porter (2000) believes culture plays a role in economic progress, he 
acknowledges that culture is complex and that its effects are difficult to isolate from other 
factors, a view shared by Harrison (1985).  Porter also contends that culture has an 
influence on competitiveness at the micro or firm level.  However Porter (2000) stops 
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short of assigning blame for lack of development on developing countries poor work 
ethic, contending that a lack of proper incentives is the likely cause.   
 Although national culture may be slow to change, economic culture may be 
capable of much more rapid transformation.  Porter (2000) cites Japan‘s high savings 
rates and system of lifetime employment as relatively recent examples.   Indeed, both 
Japan‘s high savings rates and lifetime employment developed after its defeat in World 
War II.  High savings and investment rates in China would be an even more recent 
example of rapid economic cultural change.   
 Globalization, Porter (2000) argues will not eradicate national cultures but rather 
will enforce a form of discipline on economic cultures.  Porter‘s view was voiced earlier 
by American Sociologist Parsons (1967).  Parsons (1967) felt that certain aspects of 
Western culture such as industrialization and urbanization would spread across the globe 
as other societies developed.  Likewise Stiglitz (1998) contends that development 
transforms societies.  That transformation however is not orderly and linear; rather it is 
messy and sloppy.  Capitalism, Stiglitz (1998) reminds us took centuries to develop in the 
West and entailed a societal transformation from the traditional to the modern.  The long, 
uneven, and arduous development of capitalism has been well documented by North and 
Thomas (1973), Schumpeter (1991), and Weber (2003).     
Fukuyama (2002) argues for the importance of social capital, which he defines as 
the shared values and norms of a society which allow for cooperation.  Social Capital is 
of critical importance to economic development, democracy, and civil society according 
to Fukuyama.  Values and norms can be either positive or negative, with the La Cosa 
Nostra or Mafia in Southern Italy being an extreme example of negative values and 
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norms according to Fukuyama.  Putnam (1993) concurs, finding that negative values and 
institutions explain much of southern Italy‘s social and economic backwardness 
compared to the northern Italy.  Putnam‘s (1993) work built upon that of Banfield (1958) 
who found what he termed ‗amoral familism‘ hindering development in a small town in 
southern Italy.  Fukuyama (2000) also considers China and Latin America to be examples 
where strong family ties interfere with societal interactions.  According to Fukuyama 
(2000) positive or productive values include such things as: telling the truth, meeting 
obligations, and reciprocity.  The Protestant Reformation was important economically 
according to Weber (2003) because it extended honesty, reciprocity, and thrift beyond the 
immediate family to society at large.     
Culture and Taxation 
    Nerre (2008) contends that a properly functioning tax system must take into 
account a nation‘s tax culture.  Tax culture, according to Nerre, is where the economics, 
sociology, and history of a country meet.  Strumpel (1969) sees tax culture as a 
component of a nation‘s political culture.  Tax culture is embedded within the larger 
national culture.  Nerre (2008, 155) defines tax culture as: 
A country-specific tax culture is the entirety of all relevant formal and informal 
institutions connected with the national tax system and its practical execution, 
which are historically embedded within the country‘s culture, including the 
dependencies and ties caused by their ongoing interaction.    
 
 Tax culture to Nerre (2008) is created by interactions among and between 
taxpayers, tax officials, politicians, academics, as well as other tax and legal experts.  
Thus tax culture is created in much the same manner as North (1991) contends, 
institutions are created.  This differs from Schumpeter‘s (1991) view of tax culture which 
assumes imposition by the state.  In other words, a nation‘s tax culture is exclusively 
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dependent upon its tax policy, with tax payers merely responding to the incentives 
provided by the tax law.  However, Schumpeter (1991) also contends that the ideal tax 
system is bounded by a nation‘s history, economics, and sociology.   
Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace (2000) contend that a nation‘s tax system relies 
upon not only on the nation‘s tax culture but on its national culture and its institutions as 
well.  National culture and institutions place limits on a nation‘s tax system.  For 
example, some societies view certain activities as sacred, such as religious work or small 
farming and therefore those activities can only be lightly taxed.      
Nerre (2008) contends that when it comes to tax systems, one size does not fit all.  
American style tax systems have had very little success in other parts of the world going 
back to the 1930‘s.  Further, attempts to impose a tax system from one society to another 
have often led to disastrous results (Tanzi 1987).  Tanzi (1987) cites the example of the 
Cuban government publically burning the tax law recommendations of the American tax 
delegation in 1931.  American tax delegations were popular in the 1920‘s and 1930‘s and 
consisted of American tax experts advising other nation‘s governments on what a proper 
tax system ought to entail (Nerre 2008).  Needless to say, they met with limited success 
(Tanzi 1987).         
The importance of tax culture typically only becomes apparent when significant 
changes are contemplated or actually made to a country‘s tax system (Nerre 2008).  Such 
changes can result in tax cultural shock if they are made dramatically or if they are not in 
accord with the national tax culture (Nerre 2008).   
Tax culture is an often neglected aspect of the study of taxation and public 
finance.  Only in Latin America is tax culture covered extensively and there the focus is 
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almost exclusively on taxpayer compliance (Cortázar-Velarde 2000).  Taxpayer‘s 
noncompliance in Latin America is a serious problem for the region‘s governments.  
Latin American‘s are according to Tanzi (2000, 24) ―allergic to income taxes.‖  In a 
similar vein, Bird and Wallace (2003, 1) contend that taxpayers in the region ―avoid the 
full impact of the tax laws.‖  Likewise, Reid (2007) contends that in Latin America it is 
well known that the wealthy simply do not pay taxes. 
Tsakumis, Curatola, and Porcano (2007) analyze tax policy differences among 
nations and find that Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural framework is correlated with tax evasion, 
after controlling for income.  Richardson (2008) reaches a similar conclusion in a follow 
up study.   
Campbell (2004) also contends that such a thing as ‗tax culture‘ exists.  Tax 
cultures, according to Campbell exist at the national level and progress in a path 
dependent manner.  Campbell (2004) argues that the concept of bricolage applies to tax 
cultures.  With cultural bricolage, new institutions take on the characteristics of the old 
institutions they replace.  In a multi-decade analysis of the tax systems of OECD member 
countries, Campbell (2004) finds only modest convergence of tax cultures among nations 
in spite of increasing competitive pressures brought on by globalization.  Campbell‘s 
finding makes sense in light of Nerre‘s (2008) contention that tax cultures exist at the 
national level and, therefore a universally ‗objectively good‘ tax system cannot exist.  
Each nation must adopt its own unique solution to the problem of financing its 
government.  Further, since social and economic conditions change over time, it only 
follows that tax systems must evolve over time as well.  This illustrates Slemrod‘s and 
Bakija‘s (2004) observation that taxation is a perpetual struggle.  
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Optimal taxation adherents also contend that a country‘s tax policy should be 
reflective of its unique socioeconomic circumstances.  Optimal Taxation Theory seeks to 
devise a system of taxation which maximizes the social welfare of society (Slemrod 
1990).  It asks the question: What tax or set of taxes will raise sufficient revenue for the 
government while leaving the taxpayers as well off as possible?  It is an important 
question since different tax systems vary greatly in their aggregate cost to society.  Since 
economies and societies differ in important respects, so too should tax systems.  
According to Sandmo (2005) the two main elements in any optimal tax theory model are 
the social welfare function of society and the revenue needs of the government.  Other 
objectives of optimal tax theory include: minimizing the aggregate costs of taxation to 
society (Sandmo 2005), achieving production efficiency in the economy (Slemrod 1990), 
and uniformity (Sorensen 2007).  Uniformity is important for simplicities sake which 
eases compliance and administrative burdens (Sorensen 2007), an important 
consideration for tax systems first observed by Adam Smith (2009).   
 The principles of optimal taxation theory apply to developing countries as well as 
to developed ones.  Applying the theory to developing countries, however, introduces 
additional complications.  Seemingly everything is more difficult in developing countries 
and tax policy is no different.  Slemrod (1990) contends that administrative shortcomings 
are often the reason that optimal tax policies are not implemented.  Slemrod (1990) also 
contends that empirical evidence indicates countries with low levels of literacy and 
presumably less administrative capability tend to rely on easier to collect but more 
economically distorting types of taxes.  Corruption, which tends to be much more 
prevalent in developing countries, must also be taken into account in the design of a tax 
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system.  According to Barreto and Alm (2003), the optimal tax mix in a corrupt economy 
includes relatively more consumption taxation and relatively less income taxation than 
would otherwise be the case.  Optimal government size is also affected in such a society 
with a smaller government sector being preferred in corrupt societies (Barreto & Alm 
2003).  Although such tradeoffs exist for all countries, the stakes are much higher for 
developing nations.  For example, it is generally held that in developing countries in dire 
need of investment capital, capital income should not be taxed, yet the result of such a tax 
policy would be highly regressive and inefficient from a social welfare perspective.  That 
leaves developing countries with an unpleasant choice of either a highly regressive yet 
economically efficient tax system or else a less regressive but less economically efficient 
tax system.   
An additional complication of optimal taxation in the developing world is the 
problem of tax evasion.  Both Slemrod (1990) and Sandmo (2005) contend that an 
optimal tax system must take into account the effects of tax evasion.  Estimated rates of 
tax evasion differ greatly across countries and seem to be especially prevalent in Latin 
America.  Sandmo (2005) contends tax evasion is a social phenomenon and that a 
taxpayers‘ decision of whether or not to comply with the tax laws is dependent upon their 
perception of the behavior of others.   
Behavioral economists including those who study optimal taxation look at the 
question from the opposite perspective.  In other words why do people comply with tax 
laws and pay their taxes?  According to Gueth and Sausgruber (2004) empirical evidence 
indicates taxpayers do not act in their own best interests.  Most taxpayer face a small 
probability of being caught cheating on their taxes and if caught subject to a relatively 
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small penalty, yet the vast majority – at least in developed countries, comply with tax 
laws and pay their taxes provide some evidence of level of compliance.  Hanlon, Mills, 
and Slemrod (2005) examine IRS audit results and find a corporate tax evasion rate of 
only 17.4 % in the United States in 2001.  They also find individual income tax evasion 
of only 13.8 % in the same period.  Likewise Schneider (2004) finds overall tax 
compliance rates of 86.04, 84.33, 82.27, 85.10, 87.43, and 88.97 percent in Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, and Japan respectively.  Gueth and Sausgruber 
(2004) believe social motives and a sense of social duty motivates taxpayers.  Sandmo 
(2005) concurs, contending taxpayers‘ conscience and the social stigma of being caught 
compel compliance.  Taxpayers are also motivated by considerations of fairness with 
respect to the quality of governmental services received according to Sandmo (2005).  In 
Latin America‘s case it could be that poor government leads to poor taxpayer compliance 
which leads to underfunded governments which in turn contributes to poor quality 
government services.     
In summary this paper relies on the theory that culture matters (Harrison & 
Huntington 2000).  More specifically, that culture manifests itself in economically 
important ways including preferences for the size of government and the willingness to 
submit to taxation in order to pay for government.  This paper also relies on the idea that 
no universal culture exists which explains preferences for the size of government.  
Further, this paper relies on the idea that national cultures exist.  The existence of 
national cultures is supported by the theoretical work of Anderson (2006) and the 
theoretical and empirical work of Hofstede (2001) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005).  
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Additionally, this paper relies on the idea that culture can be measured and quantified in 
meaningful ways. 
Finally, this paper relies on the work of a number of other researchers who have 
theoretically or empirically addressed the determinants of government size or of national 
tax levels.  The size of the governmental sector and the level of taxation vary 
considerably among nations, among those who have contributed to understanding that 
difference include: Tocqueville (1965); Meltzer and Richard (1981); Alesina and 
Spolaore (1997); Alesina and Waciarg (1998); Rodrik (1998); Mulligan and Sala-i-
Martin (1999); Becker and Mulligan (2003); Persson and Tabellini (2004); Benarroch 
and Panday (2008); Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Togler (2008), and Aidtyand and 
Jensenz (2009). 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA, VARIABLES, AND HYPOTHESES 
The dependent variable used in this analysis, tax effort, is formally defined as the 
total amount of tax revenue collected from compulsory transfers from citizens to the 
government divided by Gross Domestic Product of the country.  Information on tax effort 
is taken from the CIA World Factbook (CIA 2010).  The CIA World Factbook compiles 
data from a number of sources.  Information on tax effort is from the International 
Monetary Fund. 
In a supplementary analysis, governmental expenditures are also used as the 
dependent variable.  This is done in order to confirm the results obtained with tax effort 
as the dependent variable. Government expenditures represent the total current 
expenditures for all governments within a country.  Information on governmental 
expenditures is taken from the CIA World Factbook (CIA 2010).   
Primary Analysis 
The main independent variables reflect cultural attributes at the national level.  
Data on the main independent variables are taken from Hofstede and Hofstede (2005).    
Hofstede‘s (2001) country scores are relative to the other countries in the set.  Four of 
Hofstede‘s five cultural dimensions are claimed to be related to tax effort.  Those cultural 
dimensions are: individualism and collectivism, masculinity and femininity, uncertainty 
avoidance, and power distance.   
Individualism ―pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are 
loose … collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth 
onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people‘s 
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lifetimes continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty‖ (Hofstede 
2005, 76).  Loyalty in collectivist societies is to the family, clan, or tribe and not to the 
nation, or society at large.  Further, there are low levels of interpersonal trust between 
individuals in such societies (Fukuyama 2002).  Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993) 
count the Sicilian Mafia as an extreme example of a high collectivist society.  High 
scores on individualism are predicted to be associated with high tax effort and 
government spending. 
Masculinity and femininity relates to traditional gender roles within society.  High 
scores on masculinity and femininity, as defined by Hofstede (2005) are associated with 
clear divisions between the sexes.  Men are strong, assertive, and driven by achievement 
and material success.  Women are modest, caring, and concerned with quality of life.  
Low scores occur when gender roles overlap.  More traditional societies tend to have 
more clearly defined gender roles than do more modern ones.  Low masculinity and 
femininity scores are predicted to be associated with high tax effort and government 
spending. 
Power distance relates to the manner in which societies deal with human 
inequality.  Inequality among individuals is explicit in the superior subordinate work 
relationship.  Inequality among people can also be related to physical or mental 
characteristics, social standing, prestige, income, wealth, power, age, or occupation 
(Hofstede 2001).  Societies in which power distance is great are termed elitist while those 
with little distance between social levels are considered pluralist.  Power distance scores 
are independent of developmental status, according to Hofstede (2001).  Power distance 
scores of countries are consistent over time as trend data indicates no evidence of 
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significant movement (Hofstede 2001).  Countries with low scores on power distance are 
expected to be associated with high taxation and government spending. 
Uncertainty avoidance relates to the coping mechanisms employed by a society to 
deal with the uncertainties of life.  Rules and regulation, both formal and informal 
compensate for the anxiety associated with an unpredictable and uncertain future 
(Hofstede 2001).  Societies have developed diverse strategies for dealing with 
uncertainty.  It is hypothesized that some of those coping strategies are more conducive 
toward higher taxation and larger governments than others.  Countries with high scores 
on uncertainty avoidance are expected to be associated with high tax effort and 
government spending. 
Control variables include Gross National Income per capita, trade openness, 
population and whether or not a country is governed by a democratically elected 
Parliament.  Gross National Income per capita is a measure of a country‘s income.  It is 
scaled on a purchasing power parity basis for comparative purposes.  Gross National 
Income per capita is obtained from the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2010).  The population of the country and its level of trade openness – 
defined as exports plus imports divided by GDP, are also control variables.  Population 
data is from the CIA (2010) World Factbook while information on trade openness is from 
the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010).  A Parliamentary 
dummy variable is also included since countries with Parliamentary type democracies 
tend to have materially larger governments.  Greater spending in Parliamentary type 
governments is thought to be the result of their need to maintain coalitions and majorities 
in order to remain in office (Persson, Roland, & Tabellini 2000).     
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Data was collected for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006 representing the 
years in which the World Values Surveys were conducted.  The surveys provide 
alternative cultural measures which allow for testing to confirm results observed using 
the Hofstede cultural measures.  Accordingly, the Hofstede (2001) cultural dimensions 
are analyzed utilizing the same time periods.  In other words, the dependent variable tax 
effort is regressed against Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions and control variables with data 
from the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006. 
Only discrete sovereign countries are included in this analysis, therefore 
groupings of countries and regions within countries which are included in Hofstede and 
Hofstede‘s (2005) analysis are excluded here.  Countries involved in this analysis consist 
of the following: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Chile, China, Columbia, Croatia, Costa Rica, Denmark, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam.   
  National cultural dimension scores as measured by Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
are in Table 1 below.  The scores are relative to one another, not absolute.  As such they 
reflect differences in cultural values among countries.  The scores are on a 0 to 100 scale 
based on the original IBM surveys.  A few scores exceed 100; those scores are based on 
45 
 
 
subsequent surveys.  A high number means that a country scores high in individualism, 
masculinity, power distance, or uncertainty avoidance.   
Table 1 
 Hofstede and Hofstede’s National Cultural Scores 
 
Country                                            PD          IND       MASC       UA 
 
 
Argentina 
 
49 46 56 86 
Australia 
 
36 90 61 51 
Austria 
 
11 55 70 70 
Bangladesh 
 
80 20 55 60 
Belgium 
 
65 75 54 94 
Brazil 
 
69 38 49 76 
Bulgaria 
 
70 30 40 85 
Canada 
 
39 80 52 48 
Czech Republic 
 
57 58 57 74 
Chile 
 
63 23 28 86 
China 
 
80 20 66 30 
Columbia 
 
67 13 64 80 
Croatia 
 
73 33 40 80 
Costa Rica 
 
35 15 21 86 
Denmark 
 
18 74 16 23 
Ecuador 
 
78 8 63 67 
El Salvador 
 
66 19 40 94 
Estonia 
 
40 60 30 60 
Finland 
 
33 63 26 59 
France 
 
68 71 43 86 
Germany 
 
35 67 66 65 
Greece 
 
60 35 57 112 
Guatemala 
 
95 6 37 101 
Hong Kong 
 
68 25 57 29 
Hungary 
 
46 80 88 82 
India 
 
77 48 56 40 
Indonesia 
 
78 14 46 48 
Iran 
 
58 41 43          59 
Ireland 
 
28 70 68          35 
Israel 
 
13 54 47          81 
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      Table 1 (continued). 
 
     Country 
 
PD IND MASC        UA 
 
Italy 
 
50 76 70 75 
Jamaica 
 
45 39 68 13 
Japan 
 
54 46 95          92 
Luxembourg 
 
40 60 50 70 
Malaysia 
 
104 26 50 36 
Malta 
 
56 59 47 96 
Mexico 
 
81 30 69 82 
Morocco 
 
70 46 53 68 
Netherlands 
 
38 80 14 53 
New Zealand 
 
22 79 58 49 
Norway 
 
31 69 8 50 
Pakistan 
 
55 14 50 70 
Panama 
 
95 11 44 86 
Peru 
 
64 16 45 87 
Philippines 
 
94 32 64 44 
Poland 
 
68 60 64 93 
Portugal 
 
63 27 31 104 
Romania 
 
90 30 42 90 
Russia 
 
93 39 36 95 
Serbia 
 
86 25 43 92 
Singapore 
 
74 20 48 8 
Slovakia 
 
104 52 110 51 
Slovenia 
 
71 27 19 88 
South Africa 
 
49 65 63 49 
South Korea 
 
60 18 39 85 
Spain 
 
57 51 42 86 
Suriname 
 
85 47 37 92 
Sweden 
 
31 71 5 29 
Switzerland 
 
34 68 70 58 
Taiwan 
 
58 17 45 69 
Thailand 
 
64 20 34 64 
Trinidad 
 
47 16 58 55 
Turkey 
 
66 37 45 85 
United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 
United States 
 
40 91 62 46 
Uruguay 
 
61 36 38        100 
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Table 1 (continued). 
      
Country 
 
PD IND MASC        UA 
 
Venezuela 
 
81 12 73 76 
Vietnam 
 
70 20 40 30 
 
 
Note. PD is Power Distance; IND is Individualism and Collectivism; MASC is Masculinity and Femininity; UA is Uncertainty 
Avoidance.  Source: Hofstede and Hofstede (2005). 
 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables for the data used in the Hofstede analysis.  Shown are the number of 
observations, minimum, maximum, mean, median, and standard deviation for each of the 
variables.  Included in the data set are observations for 68 countries from the years 1990, 
1995, 2000, and 2006. 
Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables for the tests of 
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions. 
 
        
      
Standard  
Variable n Minimum  Maximum Mean Median Deviation 
       
Tax Effort 272 1.83 59.87 23.84 18.39 17.26 
Government 
Expenditures 272 2.31 76.92 25.3 19.73 17.45 
       Individualism 272 6 91 43.41 39 23.85 
Masculinity 272 5 110 49.87 49.5 18.75 
Uncertainty Avoidance 272 8 112 67.62 70 23.08 
Power Distance 272 11 104 59.43 61 21.75 
       GNI per capita 264 490 58,750 14,049 10,355 11,289 
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Table 2 (continued). 
      
       
      
Standard  
Variable n Minimum  Maximum Mean Median Deviation 
       Population 264 0.36 1,321.85 71.90 16.28 194.49 
Trade Openness 259 3.98 438.09 71.52 56.72 60.52 
Parliamentary dummy 272 0.00 1.00 0.65 1.00 0.48 
        
Tax Effort and Government Expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Population is reflected in the millions. 
    GNI per capita is reflected in U.S. dollars. 
     
The objective of this paper is to test the hypothesis that certain characteristics of a 
nation‘s culture affect its tax effort.  More specifically, to test the hypothesis that 
countries with higher individualism and collectivism have higher tax effort.  A further 
objective is to test the hypothesis that countries with low masculinity and femininity 
scores have higher tax effort.  Such a finding will be in support of theory, outlined in this 
paper.  Another objective is to test the hypothesis that countries with high scores on 
uncertainty avoidance have higher tax effort.  The final objective is to test the hypothesis 
that countries with low power distance scores have higher tax effort.  Such findings will 
be in support of the theory outlined in this paper.   
Hypotheses 
The main hypotheses in the study are as follows: 
Statement of Null and Research (Alternative) Hypotheses:  
Ho:  There is not a relationship between Individualism and Collectivism and tax 
effort. 
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H1: There is a direct relationship between Individualism and Collectivism and tax 
effort. 
H2:  There is not a relationship between Masculinity and Feminism and tax effort. 
H3: There is a direct relationship between Masculinity and Feminism and tax 
effort. 
H4: There is not a relationship between Power Distance and tax effort. 
H5: There is a direct relationship between Power Distance and tax effort. 
H6: There is not a relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and tax effort. 
H7: There is a direct relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and tax effort. 
The basic econometric model which tests the relationship between Hofstede‘s 
(2001) cultural variables and the size of government is as follows: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽₀+ 𝛽₁𝐼𝑁𝐷i + 𝛽₂𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐶i + 𝛽₃𝑃𝐷i + 𝛽₄𝑈𝐴i + 𝛽₅𝐺𝑁𝐼it + 𝛽₆𝑃𝑂𝑃it  
+ 𝛽₇𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒it + 𝛽₈𝑃𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚it + 𝑢 
Where: 
Tax Effort is the size of the government expressed as a percentage of gross domestic 
product. 
IND is the Individualism and Collectivist country score. 
MASC is the Masculinity and Femininity country score. 
PD is the Power Distance country score. 
UA is the Uncertainty Avoidance country score. 
GNI is the Gross National Income per capita expressed on a Purchasing Power Parity 
basis. 
POP is the nation‘s population in millions. 
Trade is the Trade Openness (Exports plus Imports divided by GDP) of the country. 
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ParDum is the Parliamentary Dummy, One if the country is governed by a 
democratically elected Parliament, zero otherwise. 
u represents unobserved factors which affect the size of government.  u also includes the 
error term. 
t = 1,2,3,4 corresponding to the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006. 
i is the individual country observation.  
Supplemental Analysis 
 The supplemental analysis is conducted in order to confirm the results obtained 
from the original analysis.  This analysis utilizes an alternative source, the World Values 
Survey (Inglehart 2010) for the national cultural attributes.  The World Values Survey is 
conducted every five years or so by social science researchers from leading universities 
throughout the world.  At least one thousand people are interviewed in each of the more 
than eighty countries surveyed.  The surveys are designed to be representative samples 
and to reflect the basic values and beliefs of the societies surveyed.  Five waves of 
surveys have been conducted to date beginning in 1981.  The most recently conducted 
survey is the 2006 survey. 
 Researchers have identified two cultural dimensions which explain much of the 
variation in basic values and beliefs.  Those two cultural dimensions are traditional versus 
secular rational values and survivalist versus self expression values.  The traditional 
versus secular rational dimension reflects the importance of religion and traditional 
beliefs to society.  Strongly traditional societies are deferential to authority, view religion 
as very important in their lives, have strong family ties with well defined roles, are 
nationalistic, and have limited tolerance for others.  Societies which have high secular 
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rational values are less deferential to authority, view religion as less important, are less 
nationalistic, and have greater tolerance for others.  El Salvador and Tanzania are 
examples of countries with strong traditional values while Japan and Sweden are 
examples of countries with strong secular rational values. 
The survivalist versus self expression cultural dimension reflects the transition 
from industrial society to post-industrial or knowledge society.  In industrial societies, the 
emphasis is on economic and physical security while in knowledge societies, the 
emphasis shifts to individual well being, self expression, and the quality of life.  
Countries with high self expression values place a strong emphasis on participation in 
political and economic decision making, gender equality, and individual freedoms and 
are generally tolerant of other cultures.  Countries with strong self expressive values 
include Canada and the Netherlands.  Countries with strong survivalist values include 
Russia and Romania (see Table 3).  
As with the original analysis, the control variables consist of Gross National 
Income per capita, trade openness, population, and whether or not a country is governed 
by a democratically elected Parliament.  
Gross National Income per capita is a measure of a country‘s income.  It is scaled 
on a purchasing power parity basis for comparative purposes.  Gross National Income per 
capita is obtained from the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2010).  The population of the country and its level of trade openness – defined as exports 
plus imports divided by GDP, are also control variables.  Population data is from the CIA 
(2010) World Factbook while information on trade openness is from the World Bank‘s 
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010).  A Parliamentary dummy variable is 
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also included since countries with Parliamentary type democracies tend to have 
materially larger governments than do Presidential type democracies.  Greater spending 
in Parliamentary type governments is thought to be the result of their need to maintain 
coalitions and majorities in order to remain in office (Persson, Roland, & Tabellini 2000).     
 As with the Hofstede (2001) analysis data was collected for the years 1990, 1995, 
2000, and 2006. Countries included in the analysis of the World Values Survey (Inglehart 
2010) cultural dimensions are as follows: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia, Brazil, 
Britain, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordon, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, South Africa, South Korea, 
Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
United States, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  As with the Hofstede 
(2001) analysis, only discrete sovereign countries are included.  Accordingly, certain sub-
national regions included in the World Values Survey (Inglehart 2010) are excluded. 
  The listing of the national cultural value scores from the World Values Survey 
(Inglehart 2010) is in Table 3.  Scores for both the traditional versus secular rational 
cultural dimension and the survivalist versus self expression cultural dimension range 
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from negative two to positive two.  A negative score means that a society is more 
traditional than secular rational or else more survivalist than self expressionist; with a 
positive score the opposite is true. 
Table 3 
World Values Survey National Cultural Values 
 
World Values Survey Nation-level mean scores on Traditional/Secular-rational and 
Survival/Self-expression values dimensions, 1981 – 2007 
(wave 1=1981, wave 2=1990, wave 3= 1995, wave 4= 2000, wave 5= 2006) 
 
Trad Self  
 
Trad Self  
 
Trad Self  
Nation & Rat Surv Nation & Rat Surv Nation & Rat Surv 
Wave Values Values Wave Values Values Wave Values Values 
Albania 3 0.52 -1.56 Bulgaria 2 1.28 -1.33 Egypt 4 -1.69 -0.64 
Albania 4 0.07 -1.14 Bulgaria 3 0.90 -1.23 Egypt 4 -1.61 -0.46 
Algeria 4 -1.48 -0.74 Bulgaria 4 1.15 -1.52 El Salvador 4 -2.06 0.53 
Andorra 5 0.80 1.62 Bulgaria 5 1.13 -1.01 Estonia 2 1.30 -0.88 
Argentina 1 0.00 -0.30 BurkinaFas 5 -1.32 -0.49 Estonia 3 1.27 -1.30 
Argentina 2 -0.46 0.03 Canada 1 -0.52 1.04 Estonia 4 1.27 -1.19 
Argentina 3 -0.60 0.71 Canada 2 0.07 1.31 Ethiopia 5 -0.65 -0.36 
Argentina 4 -0.95 0.36 Canada 4 -0.16 1.72 Finland 1 0.63 0.82 
Argentina 5 -0.66 0.38 Canada 5 -0.26 1.91 Finland 2 1.21 1.26 
Armenia 3 0.55 -1.31 Chile 2 -1.10 -0.20 Finland 3 0.68 1.01 
Australia 1 -0.34 1.14 Chile 3 -0.81 -0.08 Finland 4 0.84 0.94 
Australia 3 -0.18 1.96 Chile 4 -0.87 0.12 Finland 5 0.82 1.12 
Australia 5 0.21 1.75 Chile 5 -0.87 0.00 France 1 0.54 0.13 
Austria 2 0.23 0.80 China 2 1.79 -1.13 France 2 0.38 0.71 
Austria 4 0.25 1.43 China 3 0.79 -1.23 France 4 0.52 0.94 
Azerbaijan 3 -0.14 -1.38 China 4 1.20 -0.93 France 5 0.63 1.13 
Bangladesh 3 -1.24 -1.10 China 5 0.80 -1.16 Galicia 3 -0.04 1.34 
Bangladesh 4 -1.21 -0.93 Colombia 3 -1.71 0.34 Georgia 3 -0.04 -1.31 
Belarus 2 0.93 -1.12 Colombia 4 -1.67 0.68 Ghana 3 -1.66 -0.05 
Belarus 3 0.67 -1.72 Colombia 5 -1.87 0.60 Ghana 5 -1.94 -0.29 
Belarus 4 0.89 -1.23 Croatia 3 0.72 -0.51 Greece 4 0.77 0.55 
Belgium 1 0.09 0.08 Croatia 4 0.08 0.31 Guatemala 4 -1.70      -0.17 
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Table 3 (continued). 
 
       
 
Trad Self  
 
Trad Self  
 
Trad Self  
Nation & Rat Surv Nation & Rat Surv Nation & Rat Surv 
Wave Values Values Wave Values Values Wave Values Values 
 
Belgium 2 0.40 0.77 Cyprus 5 -0.56 0.13 Hong Kong 5 1.20 -0.98 
Belgium 4 0.50 1.13 Czech 2 1.24 -0.11 Hungary 1 0.17 -1.07 
Bosnia 3 0.09 -0.56 Czech 3 1.07 0.33 Hungary 2 0.46 -1.06 
Bosnia 4 0.34 -0.65 Czech 4 1.23 0.38 Hungary 3 0.79 -0.77 
Brazil 2 -0.95 -0.38 Denmark 1 1.60 1.44 Hungary 4 0.40 -1.22 
Brazil 3 -1.29 0.02 Denmark 2 1.25 1.20 Iceland 1 0.01 0.83 
Brazil 5 -0.98 0.61 Denmark 4 1.16 1.87 Iceland 2 0.27 1.12 
Britain 1 -0.25 0.95 Dom Rep 3 -1.05 0.33 Iceland 4 0.44 1.63 
Britain 2 0.08 1.13 E Germany 2 1.06 0.60 India 2 -0.49 -0.91 
Britain 3 0.08 1.24 E Germany 3 1.74 0.58 India 3 -0.54 -0.69 
Britain 4 0.29 1.31 E Germany 5 1.46 0.26 India 4 -0.52 -0.60 
Britain 5 0.06 1.68 E. Germany 4 1.44 0.42 India 5 -0.36 -0.21 
Indonesia 4 -1.07 -0.50 Moldova 5 0.47 -1.28 Russia 2 1.09 -1.34 
Indonesia 5 -0.47 -0.80 Montenegro 3 0.58 -1.12 Russia 3 0.87 -1.85 
Iran 3 -1.40 -0.34 Montenegro 4 0.86 -1.24 Russia 4 1.09 -1.88 
Iran 4 -1.22 -0.45 Morocco 4 -1.64 -1.09 Russia 5 0.49 -1.42 
Iraq 5 -0.40 -1.68 Morocco 5 -1.32 -1.04 Rwanda 5 -1.57 -0.62 
Ireland 1 -0.92 0.59 Moscow 2 1.44 -0.79 S Africa 1 -0.53 -0.40 
Ireland 2 -1.10 1.00 N. Ireland 1 -0.78 -0.06 S Africa 2 -0.92 -0.46 
Ireland 4 -0.91 1.18 N. Ireland 4 -0.33 0.84 S Africa 3 -1.26 -0.46 
Israel 4 0.26 0.36 N. Ireland 2 -0.86 0.80 S Africa 5 -1.09 -0.10 
Italy 1 0.18 -0.60 Neth‘lands 1 0.73 0.90 S Korea 1 1.08 -0.74 
Italy 2 0.11 0.53 Neth‘lands 2 0.77 1.99 S Korea 2 1.11 -0.65 
Italy 4 0.19 0.85 Neth‘lands 4 0.84 1.94 S Korea 3 0.96 -0.64 
Italy 5 0.13 0.60 Neth‘lands 5 0.71 1.39 S Korea 5 0.61 -1.37 
Japan 1 1.41 -0.41 N. Zealand 3 0.20 1.78 S.Africa 4 -1.12 -0.10 
Japan 2 1.62 -0.12 N. Zealand 5 0.00 1.86 S.Korea 4 1.13 -0.55 
Japan 3 1.79 0.37 Nigeria 2 -1.62 -0.68 Saudi Arab. 4 -1.31 0.15 
Japan 4 1.91 0.54 Nigeria 3 -1.58 -0.68 Serbia 3 0.84 -1.05 
Japan 5 1.96 -0.05 Nigeria 4 -1.53 0.28 Serbia 4 0.65 -1.03 
Jordan 3 -1.46 -0.97 Norway 1 0.89 0.53 Serbia 5 0.35 -0.62 
Jordan 4 -1.61 -1.05 Norway 2 1.17 0.79 Singapore -0.54 -0.28 
Kyrgyz 4 -0.15 -0.91 Norway 3 1.31 1.33 Slovakia 2 .075 -0.82 
Latvia 2 1.21 -0.60 Norway 5 1.39 2.17 Slovakia 3 0.41 -0.27 
Latvia 3 1.33 -0.89 Pakistan 3 -1.39 -0.52 Slovakia 4 0.67 -0.43 
Latvia 4 0.72 -1.27 Pakistan 4 -1.42 -1.25 Slovenia 2 0.64 -0.62 
Lithuania 2 0.68 -0.64 Peru 3 -1.26 -0.18 Slovenia 3 0.69 -0.04 
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Table 3 (continued). 
 
       
 
Trad Self  
 
Trad Self  
 
Trad Self  
Nation & Rat Surv Nation & Rat Surv Nation & Rat Surv 
Wave Values Values Wave Values Values Wave Values Values 
 
Lithuania 3 0.96 -1.45 Peru 4 -1.36 0.03 Slovenia 4 0.95 0.38 
Lithuania 4 0.98 -1.00 Philipines 3 -1.38 -0.12 Slovenia 5 0.73 0.36 
Luxemburg 4 0.42 1.13 Phillipines 4 -1.21 -0.11 Spain 1 -0.26 -0.52 
Macedonia 3 0.31 -1.02 Poland 2 -0.81 -0.27 Spain 2 -0.06 0.20 
Macedonia 4 0.12 -0.72 Poland 3 -0.47 -0.41 Spain 3 -0.37 0.47 
Malaysia 5 -0.73 0.09 Poland 4 -0.43 -0.60 Spain 4 0.12 0.51 
Mali 5 -1.25 -0.08 Poland 5 -0.78 -0.14 Spain 5 0.09 0.54 
Malta 4 -1.53 -0.03 Portugal 2 -0.21 -0.43 Sweden 1 1.20 0.85 
Mexico 1 -1.15 -0.26 Portugal 4 -0.90 0.49 Sweden 2 1.17 1.54 
Mexico 2 -0.30 0.09 Puerto Rico 3 -2.01 0.81 Sweden 3 1.49 1.99 
Mexico 3 -0.81 0.30 Puerto Rico 4 -2.07 1.12 Sweden 4 1.67 2.09 
Mexico 4 -1.47 0.53 Romania 2 0.24 -1.18 Sweden 5 1.86 2.35 
Mexico 5 -1.47 1.03 Romania 3 0.36 -1.26 Switzerland 2 0.19 1.11 
Moldova 3 0.36 -1.91 Romania 4 -0.28 -1.60 Switzerland 3 0.82 1.35 
Moldova 4 0.46 -1.69 Romania 5 -0.39 -1.55 Switzerland 5 0.74 1.90 
Taiwan 3 0.66 -0.81 USA 2 -0.68 1.35 
Taiwan 5 1.16 -1.18 USA 3 -0.89 1.62 
Tanzania 4 -1.84 -0.15 USA 4 -0.52 1.59 
Thailand 5 -0.64 0.01 USA 5 -0.81 1.76 
Trinidad 5 -1.83 -0.26 Venezuela 3 -1.82 0.35 
Turkey 2 -0.89 -0.17 Venezuela 4 -1.60 0.43 
Turkey 3 -1.13 0.28 Vietnam 4 -0.68 0.22 
Turkey 4 -0.86 -0.34 Vietnam 5 -0.30 -0.26    
Turkey 5 -0.89 -0.33 W Germany 1 0.83 -0.07    
Uganda 1 -1.42 -0.50 W Germany 2 1.23 0.69    
Ukraine 3 0.84 -1.83 W Germany 3 1.55 1.52 
Ukraine 4 0.90 -1.72 W Germany 5 1.31 0.74 
Ukraine 5 0.30 -0.83 W Germany 4 1.17 0.44 
Uruguay 3 -0.21 0.48 Zambia 5 -0.77 -0.62 
Uruguay 5 -0.37 0.99 Zimbabwe 4 -1.50 -1.36 
 
Source: Inglehart (2010) 
Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables for the data used in the World Values Survey analysis.  Shown are the number 
of observations, minimum, maximum, mean, median, and standard deviation for each of 
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the variables.  Included in the data set are observations for 94 countries from the years 
1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006. 
Table 4 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables for the World 
Values Survey Analysis 
 
      
Standard  
Variable n Minimum  Maximum Mean Median Deviation 
       
       Tax Effort 191 1.21 76.38 21.71 15.15 17.55 
Gov Expenditures 191 1.70 76.92 22.71 16.94 17.25 
       Traditional vs. Rational 251 -2.07 1.96 -0.02 0.09 1.01 
Survival vs. Self      
Expression 251 -1.91 2.35 0.00 -0.08 0.99 
 
GNI per capita 211 210 53,210 12,404 8,230 10,953 
Population 205 7.18 1321.85 84.82 22.93 217.16 
Trade Openness 201 2.01 250.60 40.58 32.05 34.00 
Parliamentary dummy 251 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.00 0.50 
       
Tax Effort and Government Expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Population is reflected in the millions. 
GNI per capita is reflected in U.S. dollars. 
     
World Values Survey (Inglehart 2010) cultural dimensions are used in order to 
confirm the results observed from the tests of the Hofstede (2001) cultural variables.  The 
objective of this portion of the paper is to test the hypothesis that certain characteristics of 
a nation‘s culture affect its tax effort and the size of the governmental sector.  More 
specifically, to test the hypothesis that countries with high traditional versus secular 
rational scores have high tax effort and government spending.  An additional objective is 
to test the hypothesis that countries with high survivalist versus self expression scores 
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have high tax effort and government spending.  Such results will confirm the theory 
outlined in this paper.    
Hypotheses related to the World Values Survey are as follows: 
H8: There is not a relationship between Traditional versus Secular Rational values 
and tax effort. 
H9: There is a direct relationship between Traditional versus Secular Rational 
values and tax effort. 
H10: There is not a relationship between Survivalist versus Self Expression values 
and tax effort. 
H11: There is a direct relationship between Survivalist versus Self Expression 
values and tax effort.  
The basic econometric model which tests the relationship between World Values 
Survey (2010) cultural variables and the size of government is as follows: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0  +  𝛽₁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽₂𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽₃𝐺𝑁𝐼it + 𝛽₄𝑃𝑂𝑃it +  𝛽₅𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒it  
+  𝛽₆𝑃𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚it + 𝑢 
Where: 
 
Tax Effort is the size of the government as a percentage of gross domestic product. 
TradRat is the Traditional versus Secular Rational country score. 
SurvSelf is the Survivalist versus Self Expression country score. 
GNI is the Gross National Income per capita expressed on a Purchasing Power Parity 
basis. 
POP is the nation‘s population in millions. 
Trade is the Trade Openness (Exports plus Imports divided by GDP) of the country. 
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ParDum is the Parliamentary Dummy, One if the country is governed by a 
democratically elected Parliament, zero otherwise. 
u represents unobserved factors which affect the size of government.  u also includes the 
error term. 
t = 1,2,3,4 corresponding to the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006. 
i is the individual country observation. 
  A number of hypotheses related to the control variables used in the analysis are 
also tested.  Those hypotheses related to the other independent and control variables are 
as follows: 
H12: There is not a relationship between Gross National Income per capita and tax 
effort. 
H13: There is a direct relationship between Gross National Income per capita and  
 
tax effort.  
 
H14: There is not a relationship between Population and tax effort. 
H15: There is a direct relationship between Population and tax effort.  
H16: There is not a relationship between Trade Openness and tax effort. 
H17: There is a direct relationship between Trade Openness and tax effort. 
H18: There is not a relationship between being governed by a Parliamentary  
 
Democracy and tax effort. 
 
H19: There is a direct relationship between being governed by a Parliamentary  
 
Democracy and tax effort.  
 
Results of the hypotheses testing will be displayed and discussed in Chapter IV.  
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CHAPTER IV 
STATISTICAL METHODS AND RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
Pooled least squares regression is utilized to empirically test the main hypotheses 
of the study.   Pooled least squares regression is appropriate whenever independently 
sampled cross sections are obtained from large populations at different points in time 
(Wooldridge 2006).  Since the World Values Survey (2010) is conducted in such a 
manner, pooled least squares is appropriate.  World Values Surveys‘ (2010) were 
conducted in the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006.  The surveys provide alternative 
cultural measures which allow for testing to confirm results observed using the Hofstede 
cultural measures.  Accordingly, the Hofstede (2001) cultural dimensions are analyzed 
utilizing the same methodology - pooled least squares covering the same time periods.  In 
other words, the dependent variable tax effort is regressed against Hofstede‘s cultural 
dimensions and control variables with data from the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006.   
The first World Values Survey conducted in 1981 is excluded from this analysis 
for two reasons.  First, the survey covered only 24 countries and secondly there is a lack 
of data availability for all countries with respect to the dependent variable as well as the 
other control variables for 1981.   
 Note, the independent variables GNI per capita and population have been 
transformed in order to avoid the use of scientific notation in the results tables.  GNI per 
capita has been divided by 100 while population has been reflected in the millions. 
Pooled Regression Tax Effort Regressed on the Hofstede Variables 
The model achieved an F score of 33.53 with a p-value of 0.0000.  Overall the 
independent and control variables explain about fifty nine and a half (59.5) percent of the 
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variation in the level of tax effort with the adjusted R squared equal to 0.5946.  Table 5 
shows the coefficients, standard error, t value, and corresponding p-values for each of the 
independent variables.  As the results indicate there are strong associations between the 
various independent variables and the dependent variable, tax effort.  The result is 
consistent with and supports the theories as outlined in the paper. 
The basic econometric model which tests the relationship between Hofstede‘s 
(2001) cultural variables and the size of government is as follows: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽₀+ 𝛽₁𝐼𝑁𝐷i + 𝛽₂𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐶i + 𝛽₃𝑃𝐷i + 𝛽₄𝑈𝐴i + 𝛽₅𝐺𝑁𝐼it + 𝛽₆𝑃𝑂𝑃it  
+ 𝛽₇𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒it + 𝛽₈𝑃𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚it + 𝑢 
Where: 
Tax Effort is the size of the government as a percentage of gross domestic product. 
IND is the Individualism and Collectivist country score. 
MASC is the Masculinity and Femininity country score. 
PD is the Power Distance country score. 
UA is the Uncertainty Avoidance country score. 
GNI is the Gross National Income per capita expressed on a Purchasing Power Parity 
basis. 
POP is the nation‘s population in millions. 
Trade is the Trade Openness (Exports plus Imports divided by GDP) of the country. 
ParDum is the Parliamentary Dummy, one if the country is governed by a democratically 
elected Parliament, zero otherwise. 
u represents unobserved factors which affect tax effort.  u also includes the error term. 
t = 1,2,3,4 corresponding to the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006. 
i is the individual country observation. 
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Results from the primary analysis are reflected in Table 5 below: 
Table 5 
Pooled Regression Tax Effort on Hofstede Cultural Variables 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. T 
  p-
values 
  
       
IND 0.001163 0.000469 2.48 0.014 ** 
 MASC -0.00186 0.000395 -4.71 0.000 * 
 PD -0.00042 0.000487 -0.87 0.385 
  UA .0000969 0.000376 0.26 0.797 
  GNIpercap .0007256 .0001089 6.67 0.000 * 
 PopMil -0.00015 5.27E-05 -2.91 0.004 * 
 TrOpen -0.00027 0.000153 -1.78 0.077 *** 
 Parliament 0.063629 0.01702 3.74 0.000 * 
 1995 -0.08385 0.020785 -4.03 0.000 * 
 2000 -0.12611 0.021125 -5.97 0.000 * 
 2006 -0.05443 0.023239 -2.34 0.020 ** 
 Intercept 0.254546 0.04951 5.14 0.000 * 
 F score                     33.53                         
Adj. R
2
                   0.5946                 
N = 245 
 
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
  ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
The dummy variables designated 1995, 2000, and 2006 are included in order to 
allow the intercept to differ among time periods included in the pooled cross section.  The 
first year of the analysis, 1990, serves as the base year while subsequent years are 
assigned a dummy variable corresponding to the year of the survey.  Allowing the 
intercept to differ among time periods reflects the fact that the population surveyed may 
have different distributions in different years (Wooldridge 2006).     
The regression is rerun and the coefficients calculated in order to gauge the 
relative magnitude of the effect of each of the independent variables on the dependent 
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variable.  Beta coefficients are obtained in order to determine the relative contribution of 
the individual independent and control variables.  Although statistical significance is 
important, it does not reflect the whole story.  According to Zilack and McClosky (2007, 
2) blind adherence to statistical significance without regard to the magnitude of the effect 
represents ―mathematical statistics gone terribly wrong.‖ 
Results from the Beta coefficients of the Hofstede cultural variables are reflected 
in Table 6 below: 
Table 6 
Beta Coefficients of Tax Effort on Hofstede Cultural Variables   
 
 Beta 
 
Rank 
    
IND 0.1621422 
 
6 
MASC -0.2012843 
 
4 
PD -0.0530845 
 
10 
UA 0.0126235 
 
11 
GNIpercap 0.4717299 
 
1 
PopMil -0.1359927 
 
8 
TrOpen -0.0942896 
 
9 
Parliament 0.1751273 
 
5 
1995 -0.2058739 
 
3 
2000 -0.3146831 
 
2 
2006 -0.137193 
 
7 
 
 
As Table 6 indicates, among the variables of interest, masculinity, and femininity 
has the largest affect.  Only the control variable gross national income per capita has a 
larger affect on tax effort than does the masculinity and femininity variable.  
Individualism and collectivism also has a large affect; it has the next largest affect on the  
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dependent variable.  Accordingly, the results of the analysis are not only statistically 
significant but meaningful as well.           
 Table 7 is a table of signs.  It reflects both the predicted sign as well as the 
observed sign after running the regression.  As the table indicates, all of the variables of 
interest are observed to have the predicted sign as well as three of the four control 
variables.  Trade openness is the sole exception; it was predicted to have a positive effect 
on the dependent variable but was found to have a negative effect. 
Table 7 
 
Direction of Affects of the Independent and Control Variables on the Dependent 
Variable for the Hofstede analysis 
 
 
     
  
Predicted Observed 
 Variable 
 
Sign Sign 
 
     
Individualism and Collectivism 
 
+ + 
 Masculinity and Femininity 
 
- - 
 Uncertainty Avoidance 
 
+ + 
 Power Distance 
 
- - 
 
     GNI per capita 
 
+ + 
 Population 
 
- - 
 Trade Openness 
 
+ - 
 Parliamentary Democracy 
 
+ + 
  
  
All of the independent variables of interest are observed to have the predicted 
sign.  In other words, the direction of the affect is consistent with the hypotheses.  
Further, three of the four control variables have the predicted sign as well, trade openness 
being the sole exception.  The same results hold true when governmental expenditures are 
used as the dependent variable in place of tax effort: all of the variables of interest have 
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the predicted sign and all but trade openness among the control variables have the 
predicted sign.  Signs of statistically insignificant coefficients are however, meaningless. 
Pooled Regression Governmental Expenditures Regressed on the Hofstede Variables 
The model achieves an F score of 29.28 with a p-value of 0.0000.  Overall the 
independent and control variables explain about fifty six (56) percent of the variation in 
the level of tax effort with the adjusted R squared equal to 0.5604.  Table 8 shows the 
coefficients, standard error, t value, and corresponding p-value for each of the 
independent variables.  As the results indicate there are strong associations between the 
various independent variables and the dependent variable, tax effort.  The result is 
consistent with and supports the theories as outlined in the paper. 
Results from the analysis are reflected in Table 8 below: 
Table 8 
 
Pooled Regression Governmental Expenditures Regressed on the Hofstede Cultural 
Variables   
 
Variable Coef.    Std. Err. t    
p 
values 
  
    
      
       IND 0.001578 0.000493 3.2 0.002 * 
 MASC -0.00157 0.000415 -3.8 0.000 * 
 PD -0.00052 0.000511 -1.03 0.306 
  UA 0.000719 0.000395 1.82 0.070 *** 
 GNIpercap 6.22E-06 1.14E-06 5.44 0.000 * 
 PopMil -0.00013 5.54E-05 -2.26 0.025 ** 
 TrOpen -0.00017 0.000161 -1.03 0.303 
  Parliament 0.066532 0.017888 3.72 0.000 * 
 1995 -0.08169 0.021845 -3.74 0.000 * 
 2000 -0.15242 0.022202 -6.87 0.000 * 
 2006 -0.0847 0.024425 -3.47 0.001 * 
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Table 8 (continued). 
 
       
Variable Coef.    Std. Err. t    
p 
values 
 
    
 
       
Intercept 0.217007 0.052036 4.17 0.000 * 
 F score        29.28                         
Adj. R
2
               0.5604                             
N = 245 
 
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
  ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table 9 
Beta Coefficients Governmental Expenditures Regressed on Hofstede Cultural Variables 
 
 
Beta 
 
Rank 
    
    IND 0.2178715 
 
3 
MASC -0.1688803 
 
7 
PD -0.0650687 
 
10 
UA 0.0928475 
 
9 
GNIpercap 0.400613 
 
1 
PopMil -0.1100848 
 
8 
TrOpen -0.0569492 
 
11 
Parliament 0.1814294 
 
6 
1995 -0.1987126 
 
5 
2000 -0.3768285 
 
2 
2006 -0.2115197 
 
4 
 
 
As Table 9 indicates, among the variables of interest, individualism and 
collectivism has the largest affect on the dependent variable.  Only the control variable 
gross national income per capita has a larger affect on governmental expenditures than 
does the individualism and collectivism variable.  The parliamentary democracy variable 
and the masculinity and femininity variable also have large affects on the dependent 
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variable.  Accordingly, the results of the analysis are not only statistically significant but 
meaningful as well.     
Pooled Regression Tax Effort Regressed on the World Values Survey Variables 
The model achieved an F score of 35.91 with a p-value of 0.0000.  Overall the 
independent and control variables explain nearly sixty three (63) percent of the variation 
in the level of tax effort with the adjusted R squared equal to 0.6281.  Table 10 shows the 
coefficients, standard error, t value, and corresponding p-value for each of the 
independent variables.  As the results indicate there are strong associations between the 
various independent variables and the dependent variable, tax effort.  The result is 
consistent with and supports the theories as outlined in the paper. 
The basic econometric model which tests the relationship between World Values 
Survey (2010) cultural variables and the size of government is as follows: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0  +  𝛽₁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽₂𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽₃𝐺𝑁𝐼it + 𝛽₄𝑃𝑂𝑃it +  𝛽₅𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒it 
+  𝛽₆𝑃𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚it + 𝑢 
Where: 
Tax Effort is the size of the government as a percentage of gross domestic product. 
TradRat is the Traditional versus Secular Rational country score. 
SurvSelf is the Survivalist versus Self Expression country score. 
GNI is the Gross National Income per capita expressed on a Purchasing Power Parity 
basis. 
POP is the nation‘s population in millions. 
Trade is the Trade Openness (Exports plus Imports divided by GDP) of the country. 
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ParDum is the Parliamentary Dummy, one if the country is governed by a democratically 
elected Parliament, zero otherwise. 
u represents unobserved factors which affect tax effort.  u also includes the error term. 
t = 1,2,3,4 corresponding to the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006. 
i is the individual country observation. 
Results from the analysis are reflected in Table 10 below: 
Table 10 
Pooled Regression Tax Effort Regressed on the World Values Survey Cultural Variables 
 
Variable                         Coef. Std. Err. T 
p 
values  
  
       
TradRational 0.029695 0.011239 2.64 0.009 * 
 SurvSelf 0.035416 0.013102 2.7 0.008 * 
 PopMill -0.00015 4.76E-05 -3.12 0.002 * 
 Parliament 0.061349 0.020952 2.93 0.004 * 
 GNIpercap 5.91E-06 1.39E-06 4.25 0.000 * 
 TrOpen -0.00028 0.000197 -1.44 0.152 
  1995 -0.09 0.025786 -3.49 0.001 * 
 2000 -0.10508 0.024414 -4.3 0.000 * 
 2006 -0.05045 0.02724 -1.85 0.066 *** 
 Intercept 0.204251 0.028264 7.23 0.000 
  F score                                   35.91                      
Adj. R
2
                                 0.6281 
N = 187 
 
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 11 
 
Beta Coefficients Tax Effort Regressed on the World Values Survey Variables 
 
 
 
Beta 
 
Rank 
    
    TradRational 0.1706334 
 
5 
SurvSelf 0.2007036 
 
4 
PopMill -0.1469154 
 
7 
Parliament 0.1700956 
 
6 
GNIpercap 0.374761 
 
1 
TrOpen -0.0745561 
 
9 
1995 -0.2073203 
 
3 
2000 -0.284728 
 
2 
2006 -0.1257962 
 
8 
      
As Table 11 indicates, among the variables of interest, survivalist versus self 
expression values has the largest affect on tax effort.  Only the control variable gross 
national income per capita has a larger affect.  The traditional versus secular rational 
values variable and the parliamentary democracy variable also have large affects on the 
dependent variable.  Accordingly, the results of the analysis are not only statistically 
significant but meaningful as well.            
 Table 12 is a table of signs.  It reflects both the predicted sign as well as the 
observed sign after running the regression with the World Values Survey cultural value 
variables.  As the table indicates, all of the variables of interest are observed to have the 
predicted sign as well as three of the four control variables.  Trade openness is the sole 
exception; it was predicted to have a positive effect on the dependent variable but was 
found to have a negative effect. 
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Table 12 
 
Direction of Affects of the Independent and Control Variables on the Dependent 
Variable for the World Values Survey Analysis 
 
      
  
Predicted Observed 
  Variable 
 
Sign Sign 
  
      Traditional versus Secular Rational 
 
+ + 
  Survivalist versus Self Expressive 
 
+ + 
  
      GNI per capita 
 
+ + 
  Population 
 
- - 
  Trade Openness 
 
+ - 
  Parliamentary Democracy 
 
+ + 
   
 
As with the Hofstede (2001) table of signs shown above, all of the independent 
variables of interest in the World Values Survey analysis are observed to have the 
predicted sign.  In other words, the direction of the affect is consistent with the 
hypotheses.  Further, three of the four control variables also have the predicted sign as 
well with trade openness being the sole exception.  The same results hold true when 
governmental expenditures are used as the dependent variable in place of tax effort: all of 
the variables of interest have the predicted sign and all but trade openness among the 
control variables have the predicted sign.  Signs of statistically insignificant coefficients 
are however, meaningless. 
Pooled Regression Governmental Expenditures Regressed on the 
World Values Survey Cultural Variables 
The model achieved an F score of 35.50 with a p-value of 0.0000.  Overall the 
independent and control variables explain about sixty two and a half (62.5) percent of the 
variation in the level of governmental expenditures with the adjusted R squared equal to 
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0.6254.  Table 13 shows the coefficients, standard error, t value, and corresponding p-
value of the independent variables.  As the results indicate there are strong associations 
between the various independent variables and the dependent variable, governmental 
expenditures.  The result is consistent with and supports the theories as outlined in the 
paper. 
Results from the analysis are reflected in Table 13 below: 
Table 13 
 
Pooled Regression Governmental Expenditures Regressed on the World Values Survey 
Cultural Variables 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. T 
p 
values  
  
       
TradRational 0.0293168 0.01108 2.65 0.009 * 
 SurvSelf 0.034791 0.012917 2.69 0.008 * 
 PopMill -0.0001379 4.69E-05 -2.94 0.004 * 
 Parliament 0.0711295 0.020655 3.44 0.001 * 
 GNIpercap 5.35E-06 1.37E-06 3.90 0.000 * 
 TrOpen -0.0003082 0.000194 -1.59 0.114 
  1995 -0.0868598 0.02542 -3.42 0.001 * 
 2000 -0.1223351 0.024068 -5.08 0.000 * 
 2006 -0.0762018 0.026854 -2.84 0.005 * 
 Intercept 0.229337 0.027864 8.23 0.000 * 
 F score                     35.50             
Adj. R
2
                                    0.6254                           
N = 187 
   
 
*Statistically Significant at the .01 level.     
  ** Statistically Significant at the .05 level. 
*** Statistically Significant at the .10 level. 
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Table 14 
 
Beta Coefficients Governmental Expenditures Regressed on the World Values Survey 
Cultural Variables 
 
 
 
Beta    Rank 
    
TradRational 0.1715217 
 
      7 
SurvSelf 0.2007432 
 
5 
PopMill -0.1389565 
 
8 
Parliament 0.2007925 
 
4 
GNIpercap 0.3451889 
 
1 
TrOpen -0.0825763 
 
9 
1995 -0.2037158 
 
3 
2000 -0.3374883 
 
2 
2006 -0.1934398 
 
6 
 
 
As Table 14 indicates, among the variables of interest, survivalist versus self 
expression values has the largest affect on governmental expenditures.  Only the control 
variable gross national income per capita has a larger affect.  The traditional versus 
secular rational values variable and the parliamentary democracy variable also have large 
affects on the dependent variable.  Accordingly, the results of the analysis are not only 
statistically significant but meaningful as well.     
Supplemental Testing 
Pooled least squares regression and hypothesis testing are dependent upon a 
number of assumptions; accordingly, compliance with those assumptions is tested.  
Included are tests for the non-normality of residuals.  Additional tests are performed to 
test for outliers, influential points, and leverage.  Tests for heteroskedasticity of residuals, 
multi-collinearity, and the linearity assumption are also conducted. 
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Normality Testing 
The first series of tests are conducted in order to test for normality of residuals.  
Normality of residuals is not a requirement of regression, it is however a requirement of 
valid hypothesis testing.  If normality of residuals is lacking then the p values for the t 
and F tests are not valid (Chen et al. 2003). 
H0:  The residuals are normally distributed. 
H1:  The residuals are not normally distributed. 
 Three graphical tests of normality are conducted.  After the regression is run the 
residuals are predicted.  Then the three graphs are analyzed.  The first compared Normal 
density with the Kernel density estimate.  The second and third graphs are the qnorm and 
pnorm graphs.  The qnorm is sensitive to non-normality near the tails and the pnorm is 
sensitive to non-normality in the middle.  All three graphs show some evidence of non-
normality of residuals.   
 
Figure 1.  Comparison of Normal Density with the Kernal Density Estimate 
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Figure 2.  Pnorm Graph 
 
Figure 3.  Qnorm Graph 
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 Next the Shaprio-Wilk W test for normality is performed.  The p value of the test 
is based on the assumption that that the distribution is normal.  Given the results of the 
test, a z value of 3.356 and a p value of 0.00040, the assumption that the distribution is 
normal must be rejected.  The S-Francia or Shapiro-Francia test also yields similar results 
as does the skewness and kurtosis test for normality or sktest.   
 Based on the results of the Shaprio-Wilk W test, the S-Francia test and the sktest, 
as well as the inspection of the three graphs, the Null hypothesis that the residuals are 
normally distributed must be rejected.   
Tests for Outliers, Influential Points, and Leverage 
The next series of tests performed on the data are tests for outliers, influential 
points, and leverage.  Outliers are observations with large residuals.  They can have a 
large impact on the results of a regression. 
H0:  There are outliers which have too large an influence on the regression. 
H1:  There are no outliers which have too large an influence on the regression. 
 A visual inspection of a graph matrix was performed.  The scatter graph showed 
the relationship between the dependent variable and each of the ten independent 
variables.  Some outliers are observed, indicating a potential problem.  
 Next the Studentized Residual is calculated.  This step is followed by a stem and 
leaf display of the results.  Several of the observations are of concern since they exceeded 
the absolute value of two (Chen et al. 2003).  Indeed, three observations are less than 
negative two and eleven are greater than two.  Additionally, three observations are 
greater than three.  Observations greater than the absolute value of three are of particular 
concern according to Chen et al. (2003) The most extreme observation is 3.52 rounded.     
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Figure 4.  Stem and Leaf Display of Studentized Residuals.  Potential outliers are shaded 
in gray. 
To determine the extent to which the outliers influence the regression, those 
observations considered to be outliers are omitted and the regression rerun.  Omitting the 
outliers has little effect on the outcome.  When the three most extreme observations are 
omitted, those with residuals greater than three, the F score increases from 33.53 to 
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36.47, both with p-values of 0.0000.  The adjusted R
2
 increases from .5946 to .6181.  
Further, all of the variables which are statistically significant before the outliers are 
omitted are statistically significant afterword and at the same levels of significance.   
 Likewise when the 11 outliers with an absolute value greater than 2 are omitted, 
there is little effect on the regression.  The F score increases further to 38.53 with the p-
value remaining at 0.0000.  The adjusted R
2
 also increases further to 0.6392.  Finally, all 
of the variables which are statistically significant before the outliers are omitted are 
statistically significant afterword and at the same levels of significance with the exception 
of trade openness which becomes statistically significant at the .05 level with the 
omission of the outliers, rather than at the .10 level with the outliers included in the 
regression.  Changes in coefficients are displayed in Table 15. 
Table 15 
 
Coefficient Comparison 
 
   
Influential 
 
No Outliers Points 
 
Exclusions Excluded   Excluded 
    PD -0.0004237 -0.0000338 0.0001464 
IND 0.0011632 0.0012251 0.0009268 
MASC -0.0018595 -0.0012879 -0.001047 
UA 0.0000969 0.0000813 0.0000127 
1995 -0.0838549 -0.078752 -0.0729733 
2000 -0.1261119 -0.1132437 -0.1116504 
2006 -0.0544287 -0.0447221 -0.0535657 
GNIpercap 0.0007256 0.0007373 0.0008425 
PopMil -0.0001532 -0.0001485 -0.0001586 
TrOpen -0.0002724 -0.0002813 -0.0002285 
Parliament 0.0636291 0.052724 0.0518097 
Intercept 0.2545455 0.1862173   0.1647928 
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A test of leverage is then conducted looking for observations which have too great 
an influence.  Influential points are those observations which, if removed, would 
substantially change the estimated coefficients.  The test of leverage utilizes the 
following cutoff formula for problems: 
2𝑘 + 2
𝑛
 
where k is the number of predictor variables and n is the number of observations (Chen et 
al. 2003). 
In this analysis the calculation is (2*11 + 2)/245 which equals .097960.  A total of twelve 
observations have calculated leverage which exceeds the cutoff point.  Accordingly, the 
test of leverage also yields potential problems with the data. 
 Next, leverage is plotted against the residual squared and the graph inspected.  
This is a test for both outliers and influential points.  A number of observations are of 
concern.   
 Finally, overall measures of influence are conducted, specifically Cook‘s D and 
DFITS.  Using the conventional cutoff of 4/n (Chen et al. 2003) or in our case 4/245 = 
.016327, Cook‘s D results in 16 observations above the cutoff point.  Likewise DFITS 
whose cutoff is the absolute value of 2 (
𝑘
𝑛
) or in this case 2 (
11
245
)  which equals 
0.42378, yields 18 observations above the cutoff point.   
To determine the extent to which the influential points affect the regression, those 
observations identified by DFITS are omitted and the regression rerun.  Omitting the 
influential points has little effect on the regression.  When the 18 influential points are 
omitted, the F score increases from 33.53 to 40.41 and the p-value remains 0.0000.  
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Likewise the adjusted R
2
 increases from .5946 to .6573.  Further, all but one of the 
variables which are statistically significant before the outliers are omitted, are statistically 
significant afterword and at the same levels of significance.  The exception is trade 
openness which is statistically significant at the .10 level when all observations are 
included in the regression and not statistically significant when the influential points are 
omitted.  Changes in coefficients are displayed in Table 15 above. 
Based on the tests conducted, the Null hypothesis that there are outliers which 
have too large an influence on the regression is not rejected. 
Tests of Homoskedasticity of Residuals 
The next three tests are conducted to test the homoskedasticity of residuals.  One 
of the assumptions of regression is that the error variance or the error term has the same 
variance at any value of the independent variable (Wooldridge 2006). 
H0:  The variance of the residuals is heteroskedastic. 
H1:  The variance of the residuals is homoskedastic.  
 The first method is the graphical method where the residuals are graphed against 
the fitted values.  The reference line is set at y = 0.  In other words, there should be no 
pattern in the residuals if the variances are homoskedastic.  Visual inspection of the graph 
yields an apparent violation of the homoskedasticity assumption.   
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Figure 5.  Residuals versus Fitted (Predicted) Values 
 Next, two mathematical tests of heteroskedasticity are conducted.  Both test the 
null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homoskedastic.  The Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test of heteroskedasticity yields a chi
2
 value of 25.22 and a p value 
of 0.0000, indicating a violation of the homoskedasticity assumption.  Yielding a contrary 
result is the Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test.  For heteroskedasticity, the 
test yields a chi
2
 value of 84.84 and a p value of 0.1093.  The p value is only slightly 
higher than necessary to result in a confirmed violation of the homoskedastic assumption.   
 Based on the apparent violation of the homoskedasticity assumption from the 
visual inspection of the graph as well as the failure of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
test and the near failure of the Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test, the Null 
hypothesis that the error variance is heteroskedastic is not rejected.    
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Tests for Multi-Collinearity 
Next the variance inflation factor or VIF is calculated in order to test for multi-
collinearity.  When multi-collinearity of the independent variables exists; the coefficients 
are unstable and the standard errors for the coefficients are inflated (Chen et al. 2003).   
H0:  Multi-collinearity among predictor variables exists. 
H1:  Multi-collinearity among predictor variables does not exist. 
 VIF values greater than 10 are problematic as are Tolerances, defined as 1/VIF 
less than 0.1.  Results of the tests indicated no multi-collinearity problem as all VIF‘s and 
Tolerances are well within the acceptable range.  Indeed, the highest total VIF is only 
3.07 and the mean VIF 1.83.  Accordingly, the Null hypothesis is rejected.  In other 
words no multi-collinearity problem exists. 
Tests of the Linearity Assumption 
Next a test of the linearity assumption is conducted by plotting the standardized 
residuals against each of the 11 predictor variables.  In any linear regression it is assumed 
that the relationship between each of the independent variables and the dependent 
variable is linear.  
H0:  The relationship between each of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable is not linear. 
H1:  The relationship between each of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable is linear. 
  Visual inspection of the 11 graphs yields no clear pattern of nonlinearity.  
Accordingly the Null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted.  In 
other words, there is no problem with the linearity assumption. 
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In the aggregate the tests of the data described above indicate that there are some 
minor problems with the data.  However, data sets with problems are frequent 
occurrences and methods have been developed to overcome such problems.  According 
to researchers at UCLA (Chen et al. 2003) the use of Huber-White sandwich estimators 
can adequately compensate for such minor errors in the data as lack of normality, 
heteroskedasticity, outliers, leverage, and influential points.  Accordingly the data is 
utilized as is but the regression is performed using the robust option for estimating 
standard errors.  No outliers are omitted since they do not have a substantial effect on the 
regression. 
The tests of normality of residuals; outliers, influential points, and leverage; 
heteroskedasticity; multi-collinearity, and of the linearity assumption are all conducted on 
the Hofstede data.  Similar results are obtained when the World Values Survey data is 
tested. 
Table 16 
Robust Pooled Regression with Tax Effort Regressed on the Hofstede Cultural Variables  
  
 
   
Variable Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Error T 
p  
values 
 
      PD -0.000424 0.0005311 -0.80 0.426 
 IND 0.0011632 0.0004663 2.49 0.013 ** 
MASC -0.00186 0.000425 -4.38 0.000 * 
UA 0.0000969 0.0003897 0.25 0.804 
 1995 -0.083855 0.0216037 -3.88 0.000 * 
2000 -0.126112 0.0205253 -6.14 0.000 * 
2006 -0.054429 0.0236616 -2.30 0.022 ** 
PopMil -0.000153 0.0000494 -3.10 0.002 * 
Parliament 0.0636291 0.0167622 3.80 0.000 * 
TrOpen -0.000272 0.0001828 -1.49 0.137 
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Table 16 (continued). 
 
 
 
   
Variable 
 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Error T 
p  
values 
  
GNIpercap2 0.0007256 0.0001328 5.47 0.000 * 
Intercept 0.2545455 0.0541304 4.70 0.000 * 
F score               33.84                    
R
2
              0.6129                   
N = 245 
 
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
  ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table 17 
 
Robust Pooled Regression with Government Expenditures Regressed on the Hofstede 
Cultural Variables  
 
Variable Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Error T 
p 
values  
 
      
PD -0.000524 0.0005755 -0.91 0.363 
 IND 0.0015776 0.0005345 2.95 0.003 * 
MASC -0.001575 0.0004322 -3.64 0.000 * 
UA 0.000719 0.0004053 1.77 0.077 *** 
1995 -0.081691 0.0243652 -3.35 0.001 * 
2000 -0.152423 0.0215814 -7.06 0.000 * 
2006 -0.084697 0.0247401 -3.42 0.001 * 
PopMil -0.000125 0.0000484 -2.59 0.010 * 
Parliament 0.0665324 0.0177659 3.74 0.000 * 
TrOpen -0.000166 0.000178 -0.93 0.352 
 GNIpercap2 0.000622 0.0001211 5.14 0.000 * 
Intercept 0.217007 0.0564577 3.84 0.000 * 
F score               35.88                     
R
2
              0.5802                   
N = 245 
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
  ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 18 
 
Robust Pooled Regression with Tax Effort Regressed on the World Values Survey 
Cultural Variables  
 
Variable Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Error T 
p 
values  
 
      
TradRational 0.0296945 0.0122269 2.43 0.016 ** 
SurvSelf 0.0354157 0.0139419 2.54 0.012 ** 
PopMill -0.000148 0.000033 -4.49 0.000 * 
Parliament 0.0613493 0.0174983 3.51 0.001 * 
TrOpen -0.000283 0.0002031 -1.39 0.165 
 GNIpercap2 0.0005912 0.0001649 3.58 0.000 * 
1995 -0.090002 0.0304645 -2.95 0.004 * 
2000 -0.105084 0.0284412 -3.69 0.000 * 
2006 -0.050455 0.0285475 -1.77 0.079 
 Intercept 0.2042512 0.0314703 6.49 0.000 * 
F score               28.06                   
R
2
              0.6461                   
N = 187 
 
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
  ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table 19 
 
Robust Pooled Regression with Government Expenditures Regressed on the World 
Values Survey Cultural Variables.  
 
Variable Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Error T 
p 
values  
 
      
TradRational 0.0293168 0.0120794 2.43 0.016 ** 
SurvSelf 0.034791 0.013222 2.63 0.009 * 
PopMill -0.000138 0.0000321 -4.29 0.000 * 
Parliament 0.0711295 0.0176436 4.03 0.000 * 
TrOpen -0.000308 0.0001854 -1.66 0.098 *** 
GNIpercap2 0.0005348 0.000134 3.99 0.000 * 
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Table 19 (continued). 
     
      
Variable Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Error T 
p 
values  
 
      1995 -0.08686 0.030639 -2.83 0.005 * 
2000 -0.122335 0.0272471 -4.49 0.000 * 
2006 -0.076202 0.028149 -2.71 0.007 * 
Intercept 0.229337 0.0305507 7.51 0.000 * 
F score               36.63                        
R
2
              0.6435                             
N = 187 
 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.     
  ** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Evaluation of the Null and Alternative or Research Hypotheses 
Ho:  There is not a relationship between Individualism and Collectivism and tax 
effort. 
H1: There is a direct relationship between Individualism and Collectivism and tax 
effort. 
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship 
between the individualism and collectivism cultural variable and tax effort.  As Table 16 
indicates the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  Further, the relationship is 
meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6 and has the correct 
sign as indicated by Table 7.  Additionally, all of the results are confirmed when 
governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable.  
Indeed, as Table 17 indicates the correlation is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
85 
 
 
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the 
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the alternative or research Hypotheses 
accepted.  
H2:  There is not a relationship between Masculinity and Femininity and tax 
effort. 
H3: There is a direct relationship between Masculinity and Femininity and tax 
effort. 
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship 
between the masculinity and femininity cultural variable and tax effort.  As Table 16 
indicates the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.  Further, the relationship is 
meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6 and has the correct 
sign as indicated by Table 7.  Additionally, all of the results are confirmed when 
governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable. 
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the 
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the alternative or research Hypotheses 
accepted.  
H4: There is not a relationship between Power Distance and tax effort. 
H5: There is a direct relationship between Power Distance and tax effort. 
Pooled least squares regression finds no statistically significant relationship 
between the power distance cultural variable and tax effort.  As Table 16 indicates the 
correlation is not significant at any level.  Further, the relationship is not very meaningful 
as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6, although the variable does have 
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the correct sign as indicated by Table 7.  Additionally, all of the results are confirmed 
when governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable. 
Considering the lack of statistical significance as well as the lack of 
meaningfulness of the results, the Null Hypotheses is not rejected.  
H6: There is not a relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and tax effort.  
H7: There is a direct relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and tax effort. 
Pooled least squares regression finds no statistically significant relationship 
between the uncertainty avoidance cultural variable and tax effort.  As Table 16 indicates 
the correlation is not significant at any level.  Further, the relationship is not very 
meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6, although the variable 
does have the correct sign as indicated by Table 7.  As Table 17 indicates, when 
governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable, the 
results are significantly significant at the .10 level.  However, the result is still not very 
meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6.   
Considering the lack of statistical significance as well as the lack of 
meaningfulness of the results, the Null Hypotheses is not rejected.  
H8: There is not a relationship between Traditional versus Secular Rational values 
and tax effort. 
H9: There is a direct relationship between Traditional versus Secular Rational 
values and tax effort. 
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship 
between the traditional versus secular rational cultural variable and tax effort.  As Table 
18 indicates the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  Further, the relationship is 
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meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 11 and has the correct 
sign as indicated by Table 12.  Additionally, all of the results are confirmed when 
governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable.    
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the 
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the alternative or research Hypotheses 
accepted.  
H10: There is not a relationship between Survivalist versus Self Expression values 
and tax effort.  
H11: There is a direct relationship between Survivalist versus Self Expression 
values and tax effort. 
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship 
between the survivalist versus self expression cultural variable and tax effort.  As Table 
18 indicates the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  Further, the relationship is 
meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 11 and has the correct 
sign as indicated by Table 12.  Additionally, all of the results are confirmed when 
governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable.    
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the 
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the alternative or research Hypotheses 
accepted.  
H12: There is not a relationship between Gross National Income per capita and tax 
effort. 
H13: There is a direct relationship between Gross National Income per capita and 
tax effort.  
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Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship 
between gross national income per capita and tax effort.  As Table 16 indicates the 
correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.  Further, the relationship is meaningful as 
evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6.  Indeed gross national income per 
capita has the largest effect of all the independent variable on the dependent variable.  
Further, the variable has the correct sign as indicated by Table 7.  All of the results are 
confirmed when governmental expenditures are used as the dependent variable as 
indicated by Tables 17 and 19.  All of the results are further confirmed when World 
Values Survey independent variables are used.    
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the 
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the alternative or research Hypotheses 
accepted.  
H14: There is not a relationship between Population and tax effort. 
H15: There is a direct relationship between Population and tax effort.  
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship 
between population and tax effort.  As Table 16 indicates the correlation is significant at 
the 0.01 level.  Further, the relationship is meaningful as evidenced by the Beta 
coefficients found in Table 6.  Additionally, the variable has the correct sign as indicated 
by Table 7.  All of the results are confirmed when governmental expenditures are used as 
the dependent variable as indicated by Tables 17 and 19.  All of the results are further 
confirmed when World Values Survey independent variables are used. 
 Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the 
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the research Hypotheses accepted.  
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H16: There is not a relationship between Trade Openness and tax effort. 
H17: There is a direct relationship between Trade Openness and tax effort. 
Pooled least squares regression finds no statistically significant relationship 
between trade openness and tax effort.  As Tables 16, 17, and 18 indicate the correlation 
is not significant at any level.  Only Table 19 indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 
level.  Further, the relationship is not very meaningful as evidenced by the Beta 
coefficients found in Tables 6 and 11 and the variable has the wrong sign as indicated by 
Table 7.  When governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent 
variable the relationship is not very meaningful as evidenced by Tables 9 and 14 and the 
sign remains incorrect.    
Considering the lack of statistical significance as well as the lack of 
meaningfulness of the results and the wrong signs, the Null Hypotheses is not rejected.  
H18: There is not a relationship between being governed by a Parliamentary 
Democracy and tax effort. 
H19: There is a direct relationship between being governed by a Parliamentary 
Democracy and tax effort.  
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship 
between the parliament independent variable and tax effort.  As Table 16 indicates the 
correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.  Further, the relationship is meaningful as 
evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6.  Indeed the parliament variable has 
the third largest effect of all the independent variable on the dependent variable and the 
variable has the correct sign as indicated by Table 7.  All of the results are confirmed 
when governmental expenditures are used as the dependent variable as indicated by 
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Tables 17 and 19.  All of the results are further confirmed when World Values Survey 
independent variables are used.   
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the 
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the research Hypotheses accepted. 
Summary of Findings 
 The statistical analysis confirms the theory outlined in the paper that certain 
national culture attributes affect tax effort.  The Hofstede (2001) cultural attributes 
individualism and collectivism and masculinity and femininity both are statistically 
significant and meaningful when regressed on tax effort.  Likewise the World Values 
Survey‘s (2010) cultural attributes of traditional versus secular rational and survivalist 
versus self expression are also both statistically significant and meaningful when 
regressed on tax effort.  
 Additionally three out of four control variables are statistically significant when 
regressed on tax effort.  Population, gross national income per capita, and the existence of 
a parliament are all statistically significant while trade openness is not.  Likewise, the 
Hofstede (2001) cultural dimensions of power distance and uncertainty avoidance lack 
statistical significance. 
 The results are robust to changes in the measure of national culture utilized as 
evidenced by the comparable results from the Hofstede (2001) variables and the World 
Value Survey (2010) variables.  The results are also robust to changes in the dependent 
variable when governmental expenditure is substituted for tax effort.  Finally, the results 
are also robust to the inclusion or exclusion of outliers and influential points. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
As the results of the statistical analysis clearly indicate, cultural factors do indeed 
play a role in determining a country‘s level of tax effort and the size of its government.  
In other words, the cultural differences observed among countries provide a partial 
explanation for the differences in aggregate tax levels and the size of governments.  
Certain cultural attributes or dimensions, specifically Hofstede‘s (2001) individualism 
and collectivism and masculinity and femininity as well as the World Values Survey‘s 
(2010) traditional versus secular rational and survivalist versus self expression cultural 
values, all have a statistically significant and meaningful affect on tax effort.  As 
predicted by the theory outlined in the paper, countries with high individualism and 
collectivism scores have high tax effort and countries with low masculinity and 
femininity scores also have high tax effort.  Likewise countries with high scores on the 
traditional versus secular rational cultural dimension have high tax effort and countries 
with high levels on the survivalist versus self expression cultural value also have high tax 
effort.   
Contributions of This Research 
 This research contributes to the understanding of the differences among countries 
in tax effort and the related size of the governmental sector.  It adds to the list of factors 
or determinants which affect tax effort and the size of government.  This research 
explains about sixty (60) percent of the variation observed in tax effort among countries, 
after controlling for other known or theorized determinants.    
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Limitations of this Research 
 There are a number of limitations and weaknesses to various aspects of this 
analysis.   There are limitations and weaknesses with respect to the data utilized in this 
analysis.  Tax effort, for example can be and is calculated in a number of different ways.  
The same is true with government spending.  Missing or incomplete data is a significant 
problem whenever differences among countries are analyzed; this is especially true of 
countries in the developing world.  Although the survey data used to calculate the 
national cultural scores may be complete, information on the control variables such as 
GDP or trade openness may be estimates.  Even in the highly developed United States 
there are limitations with respect to population counts.  Likewise, even a well understood 
and widely used measure of national income like GDP or GNI suffers from a number of 
limitations.  Again, this is especially true of developing nations where often a majority of 
economic activities are part of the transaction economy.    
 There are limitations with respect to Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural dimensions.  
Baskerville (2003) objects to Hofstede‘s equating of culture with nation as well as his use 
of numerical indices in an attempt to quantify and explain something as complex as 
culture.  Further Baskerville (2003) questions the ability of anyone outside of a culture 
from understanding the culture.  In other words, it takes a Frenchman to understand 
French culture.    
 Like Baskerville (2003), McSweeney (2003) objects to Hofstede‘s cultural 
dimensions on multiple grounds.  He questions the existence of national culture and 
doubts that something as elusive as culture can be operationalized.  McSweeney (2003) 
also questions the ability of a survey of the employees of one corporation being able to 
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capture the information required to measure cultures of nations.  It represents no more 
than a narrow survey, according to McSweeney (2003), certainly not a national survey.  
McSweeney (2003) also questions the ability of an outsider to gain a complete 
understanding of another culture.    
 Hofstede (2001) appears to be aware of the limitations of his cultural dimensions.  
Hofstede (2001) acknowledges, describes, and replies to many such critiques.  Hofstede 
(2001) addresses the critique that nations are not the best units of measurement for 
studying culture.  Most nations of the world are not monolithic single culture entities; 
rather they are a complex mixture of overlapping multiple sub-cultures.  However nations 
exist and, according to Hofstede (2001) and others, they differ greatly in their underlying 
cultures.  Hofstede (2001) argues that a national culture is common to most members of a 
nation, even those from markedly differing subcultures.  Hofstede goes on to argue that 
while nations may not be the optimal unit of measure, they are a useful measure.  Nations 
are particularly useful for cross country comparisons.  
 The next methodological critique Hofstede (2001) discusses is what can be 
termed the generalization issue.  It is not reasonable, critics argue, to generalize from a 
survey of the employees of only one multinational firm to an entire nation.  In other 
words the IBM employees surveyed do not represent an accurate sample of the entire 
nations from which they originate.  IBM is a unique organization even among 
multinational firms and it undertakes great effort to foster an IBM culture among its 
worldwide employees.  Hofstede (2001) counters that what he is measuring are 
differences in cultural attributes.  Granted IBM employees are not representative of the 
nations from which they originate, however, IBM employees at all levels and from all 
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departments of the organization  are surveyed, everyone from grounds-keeping to 
corporate executives  are  included in the surveys.  While the IBM employees surveyed 
may not constitute a representative sample of the nations from which they originate, those 
employees retain certain national cultural attributes and it is those attributes which 
Hofstede (2001) contends are being measured.  The only difference among the groups of 
employees from the various countries surveyed is nationality; in all other material 
respects the employees are similar.  Accordingly, the scores on Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural 
dimensions should be an accurate reflection of the differences in national cultural 
attributes. 
 The final critique Hofstede (2001) addresses is the age of the surveys.  The IBM 
employee surveys began in the late 1960‘s and many critics question the continuing 
validity of such old data.  Hofstede (2001) counters that argument by stating that survey 
work continues and, further that national cultural attributes are remarkably stable over 
time.  Indeed, Hofstede (2001) maintains that many cultural distinctions among European 
nations can be traced back to the Roman Empire.  Further, there have been numerous 
subsequent surveys by other researchers which have replicated the IBM results.  In major 
replication studies, Hoppe (1990), Shane (1995), Merritt (2000), Sondergaard (2002), van 
Nimegen (2002), and de Mooij (2004) all confirm Hofstede‘s (2001) findings.  
Additionally, many researchers in many different fields continue to use the cultural 
dimensions and find them to be correlated with many economic and social phenomena.   
 In the final analysis, the quality of a measure of a societal cultural attribute is 
dependent upon its usefulness.  Is the measure statistically correlated with important 
social, political, and economic phenomena?  Are those correlations meaningful and does 
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the measure provide explanatory and predictive power?  If the answers to the above 
questions are yes, then it is reasonable to assume that the measures of cultural attributes 
are valid.  The use of Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural dimension measures by other researchers 
provides direct though limited support for their usage in this analysis. 
 The use of World Values Survey (2010) in the supplementary analysis mitigates 
many of the limitations of the Hofstede (2001) data.  This is especially true with respect 
to criticisms regarding the narrowness of Hofstede‘s study as well as limitations with 
respect to the age of the surveys. 
Perhaps the most significant limitation of this research is the danger that rather 
than national cultural attributes affecting tax effort, it could be some other unknown 
factor which affects both national cultural attributes and tax effort.  As with most 
research in the social sciences, there are a large number of determinates which affect the 
dependent variable, many of them unknown and perhaps even unknowable.   
Areas of Further Study and Research 
 A number of areas of further research are suggested by this study.  Both the 
contributions of this research and the limitations of this research provide suggestions for 
further study.    
The first area of further research would be to continue the search for determinants 
of tax effort.  Although this study adds to the understanding of the differences in tax 
effort among nations, some two fifths of the difference remains unexplained.  
Another area of research could attempt to find correlations with respect to 
national cultural attributes and the type of tax system a nation employs.  Tax systems can 
take on many different forms, utilizing different types of taxes as well as varying degrees 
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of progressivity with respect to those taxes. Do certain national cultural attributes, for 
example, lead to a greater reliance on income taxation or alternatively, consumption 
taxation?  Likewise, a further area of research could be an attempt to find correlations 
with respect to national cultural attributes and the progressivity of the tax system.  In 
other words, do certain national cultural attributes lead to a more or less progressive tax 
system?  
 Another area of study could be to analyze the effects of national cultural attributes 
and their effect on the various components of government spending.  Does culture affect 
governmental education spending, for example?  Or social welfare spending and transfer 
payments?  Or defense spending or spending on basic research and development?  In 
other words, is there any correlation with national cultural attributes and the major 
categories of government spending? 
 Another area of future research could be looking at changes to the tax system of a 
country over time and attempting to correlate those changes with national cultural 
changes over the same time period.  Such a time series analysis would require a long time 
frame as national cultural attributes appear to change very slowly. 
A final area of potential future research is that of optimal taxation.  Optimal 
taxation theory seeks to devise a system of taxation which maximizes the social welfare 
of society (Slemrod 1990).  It asks the question: What tax or system of taxes will raise 
sufficient revenue for the government while leaving the society and its taxpayers as well 
off as possible?  Optimal taxation addresses an important question since different tax 
systems vary greatly in their aggregate cost to society.  Optimal taxation proponents 
contend that a country‘s tax policy should be reflective of its unique socioeconomic 
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circumstances.  Since economies and societies differ in important respects, so too should 
their tax systems.  In other words no two tax systems should be alike since no two 
societies are alike.  Likewise the optimal tax system of a society will change as 
socioeconomic conditions change within the country.  Finding a society‘s optimal tax 
effort and optimal tax system is perhaps the highest goal of tax policy research.      
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